COMMENT: A Minor Conflict: Why the Objectives of Federal Sex Trafficking Legislation Preempt the Enforcement of State Prostitution Laws Against Minors by Crile, Susan
American University Law Review
Volume 61 | Issue 6 Article 4
2012
COMMENT: A Minor Conflict: Why the
Objectives of Federal Sex Trafficking Legislation
Preempt the Enforcement of State Prostitution
Laws Against Minors
Susan Crile
American University Washington College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr
Part of the Juveniles Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Crile, Susan. "COMMENT: A Minor Conflict: Why the Objectives of Federal Sex Trafficking Legislation Preempt the Enforcement of
State Prostitution Laws Against Minors." American University Law Review 61, no.6 (2012): 1783-1824.
COMMENT: A Minor Conflict: Why the Objectives of Federal Sex




This comment is available in American University Law Review: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol61/iss6/4




A MINOR CONFLICT:  WHY THE 
OBJECTIVES OF FEDERAL SEX 
TRAFFICKING LEGISLATION PREEMPT THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF STATE PROSTITUTION 
LAWS AGAINST MINORS 
SUSAN CRILE* 
The doctrine of federal preemption provides a framework for resolving the 
tension between the treatment of prostituted minors under federal sex 
trafficking law and criminal prostitution laws in many states.  Federal 
preemption doctrine holds that state laws are preempted if they conflict with a 
federal law by frustrating its purpose.  The federal Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act (TVPA) defines individuals under age eighteen who engage in 
commercial sex as per se victims of severe sex trafficking.  The TVPA seeks to 
protect these individuals by treating them as victims and providing them with 
services.  Many states, on the other hand, define prostitution without regard to 
age and enforce criminal prohibitions against the same category of minors that 
the federal law seeks to protect.  This Comment argues that states’ enforcement 
of criminal prostitution laws against minors frustrates the TVPA’s purposes 
with regard to prostituted minors by (1) treating prostituted minors as 
offenders, rather than victims, (2) contributing to misidentification of victims, 
and (3) discouraging prostituted minors from cooperating with law 
enforcement, thereby impeding federal efforts to investigate and prosecute 
                                                          
 * Junior Staff Member, American University Law Review, Volume 61; J.D. 
Candidate, May 2013, American University, Washington College of Law; B.S., Philosophy, 
2007, Trinity College.  This Comment was inspired by Kate Mogulescu and her work 
on behalf of victims of sex trafficking.  Kate, thank you for teaching me so much.  I 
would also like to thank Professor Jeffery Wennar and Lindsay Cronin for their 
guidance.  Finally, to Kat Scott and the rest of the Law Review staff—thank you for 
making this Comment better in every way. 
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“We have created a legal dichotomy in America in which the 
Federal Government views prostituted children as victims, yet most 
[s]tates treat them as criminals.”1 
                                                          
 1. In Our Own Backyard:  Child Prostitution and Sex Trafficking in the United States:  
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
111th Cong. 2 (2010) [hereinafter In Our Own Backyard] (statement of Sen. Richard 
Durbin, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Human Rights & the Law). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Minors under the age of eighteen are purchased for sex 
throughout America.2  The full extent of the problem is difficult to 
measure,3 in part because of the underground nature of prostitution 
generally,4 but also because prostituted minors5 are commonly 
subjected to psychological manipulation and abuse that makes them 
unlikely to self-identify as victims.6  Despite the difficulty of measuring 
the problem, however, it is certain that the number of minors 
involved in prostitution is substantial.7  For example, the U.S. 
Congress has cited research suggesting up to 300,000 American 
minors are at risk for commercial sexual exploitation.8  An article 
published by the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Office of Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention further estimates that, for those 
at-risk individuals who do enter into prostitution, the average age of 
entrance is thirteen- or fourteen-years-old.9  These young people 
                                                          
 2. See LINDA A. SMITH ET AL., SHARED HOPE INT’L, THE NATIONAL REPORT ON 
DOMESTIC MINOR SEX TRAFFICKING:  AMERICA’S PROSTITUTED CHILDREN 11 (2009), 
available at http://www.sharedhope.org/Portals/0/Documents/SHI_ 
National_Report_on_DMST_2009.pdf (describing the results of a study of domestic 
minor sex trafficking in ten U.S. locations and concluding that domestic minor sex 
trafficking was a substantial problem with three locations reporting more than 100 
victims in one to eight years and one location reporting more than 5000 victims in 
thirteen years); see also Child Exploitation & Obscenity Section, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/subjectareas/prostitution.html (last visited 
Aug. 20, 2012) (noting that prostituted minors come from various parts of America). 
 3. See David Finkelhor & Richard Ormrod, Prostitution of Juveniles:  Patterns from 
NIBRS, JUV. JUSTICE BULL., June 2004, at 1–2 available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/203946.pdf (noting that statistics on juveniles 
involved in prostitution have often relied on conjecture). 
 4. See SMITH ET AL., supra note 2, at 29 (noting that the underground character 
of prostitution is more pronounced today because much marketing of prostitution 
has transferred to online forums, where it is arguably harder to detect); cf. Finkelhor 
& Ormrod supra note 3, at 10 (reporting that local law enforcement confusion about 
whether minors should be categorized as victims or offenders compounds the 
difficulty of measuring the number of prostituted minors). 
 5. I use the term “prostituted minor” throughout this Comment to refer to 
individuals under age eighteen who are involved in commercial sex. 
 6. See SMITH ET AL., supra note 2, at 41 (suggesting that prostituted minors’ 
failure to self-identify as victims is linked to the formation of trauma bonds caused by 
“pimp control”); see also Kate Brittle, Note, Child Abuse by Another Name:  Why the Child 
Welfare System is the Best Mechanism in Place to Address the Problem of Juvenile Prostitution, 
36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1339, 1344 (2008) (noting that minors are often trained by 
pimps to lie about their age or to deny any involvement in prostitution). 
 7. See DUREN BANKS & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
CHARACTERISTICS OF SUSPECTED HUMAN TRAFFICKING INCIDENTS, 2008–2010, at 3 
(2011), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cshti0810.pdf (showing 
that federally funded human trafficking task forces opened 2515 investigations of 
human trafficking between 2008 and 2010 and that forty-percent involved 
prostitution or sexual exploitation of a child). 
 8. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-164, 
§ 2(5), 119 Stat. 3558, 3559 (2006). 
 9. William Adams et al., Effects of Federal Legislation on the Commercial Sexual 
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share characteristics, such as histories of neglect, abuse, or 
homelessness, that make them vulnerable to exploitation.10  In 
addition, they almost always have pimps—individuals who target and 
recruit vulnerable minors and use combinations of feigned affection, 
psychological coercion, and physical or emotional abuse to dominate 
their victims and profit from their sexual exploitation.11 
Federal sex trafficking law and state criminal prostitution laws are 
in conflict over the treatment of prostituted minors.12  States 
generally define prostitution without regard to age,13 meaning, for 
example, that a seventeen-year-old who engages in commercial sex 
commits prostitution under most state laws.14  In contrast, the federal 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 200015 (TVPA) establishes that 
any individual under age eighteen who engages in commercial sex is 
                                                          
Exploitation of Children, JUV. JUSTICE BULL., July 2010, at 3, available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/228631.pdf. 
 10. See Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005 § 2(6) (noting 
the susceptibility of runaway and homeless children to prostitution); FRANCES GRAGG 
ET AL., N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVS., NEW YORK PREVELANCE STUDY 
OF COMMERCIALLY EXPLOITED CHILDREN:  FINAL REPORT 45 (2007), available at 
http://www.ocfs.state.ny.us/main/reports/csec-2007.pdf (reporting that minors 
subjected to commercial sexual exploitation were overwhelmingly likely to have prior 
welfare involvement due to child abuse and neglect investigations or foster care 
placement); SMITH ET AL., supra note 2, at 49 (describing homelessness and chronic 
running away as warning signs of domestic minor sex trafficking). 
 11. See POLARIS PROJECT, DOMESTIC SEX TRAFFICKING:  THE CRIMINAL OPERATIONS 
OF THE AMERICAN PIMP 3, available at http://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/victims/ 
humantrafficking/vs/documents/Domestic_Sex_Trafficking_Guide.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 20, 2012) (discussing the general technique of “pimp control,” involving an 
initial period of affection or romance, followed by a “grooming” period, and then 
sexual exploitation imposed through psychological coercion and physical violence); 
SMITH ET AL., supra note 2, at 38 (asserting that a popular tactic of traffickers and 
pimps is to identify a victim’s need—whether it be the need for a parental presence 
or the need for a place to sleep—and to fill that need, so as to establish 
dependency). 
 12. See infra Part II.B (describing how the enforcement of criminal prostitution 
laws against minors in some states conflicts with the federal government’s objectives 
of protecting victims of trafficking and prosecuting traffickers). 
 13. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6419(a) (2012) (“Prostitution is performing for 
hire, or offering or agreeing to perform for hire where there is an exchange of value, 
any of the following acts:  (1) Sexual intercourse; (2) sodomy; or (3) manual or other 
bodily contact stimulation of the genitals of any person with the intent to arouse or 
gratify the sexual desires of the offender or another.”); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 
851(1) (2006) (criminalizing “engaging in, or agreeing to engage in, or offering to 
engage in a sexual act or sexual contact . . . in return for a pecuniary benefit”); see 
also Daniel J. Franklin, Prostitution and Sex Workers, 8 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 355, 356 n.5 
(2007) (collecting state prostitution statutes). 
 14. See Wendi J. Adelson, Child Prostitute or Victim of Trafficking?, 6 U. ST. THOMAS 
L.J. 96, 97 & n.2 (2008) (observing that minors are subject to criminal penalties for 
prostitution in all but one state); see also infra Part I.A.2 (describing newly enacted 
state laws that prevent criminal prosecution of some prostituted minors). 
 15. Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8, 18 and 22 U.S.C. (2006 & Supp. I 2008)). 
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a victim of sex trafficking.16  Thus, the same seventeen-year-old who 
would be treated by state law as a criminal deserving punishment is 
viewed by federal law as a victim of sex trafficking entitled to 
protection. 
This Comment argues that under the doctrine of federal 
preemption, the TVPA preempts enforcement of state criminal 
prostitution laws against minors.  Preemption refers to the 
displacement of state law by federal law pursuant to the Supremacy 
Clause of the Constitution.17  Preemption can be inferred from the 
existence of a conflict between federal and state laws; a conflict exists 
if state law frustrates the purpose of a federal law.18  In this case, the 
TVPA preempts states’ application of criminal prostitution laws to 
minors because enforcing criminal prostitution laws against minors 
frustrates the TVPA’s objectives of protecting sex trafficking victims 
and prosecuting traffickers.  Part I provides an overview of how state 
prostitution laws apply to minors and examines the federal TVPA.  
Part I also explains the doctrine of federal preemption, focusing 
particularly on conflict preemption, a mode of implied preemption.  
Part II uses implied conflict preemption principles, which hold that 
federal law preempts state law where state law impedes the objectives 
of federal law, to analyze the TVPA’s preemptive effect on 
applications of state prostitution laws to minors.  This analysis shows 
that applying state prostitution laws to minors frustrates the 
accomplishment and full execution of the TVPA’s prosecutorial and 
protective purposes.  This Comment concludes that states’ 
enforcement of criminal prostitution laws against minors is 
preempted by the TVPA. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. State Laws Governing the Treatment of Prostituted Minors 
Traditionally, state laws have addressed minors in prostitution only 
insofar as the minors come under general criminal prohibitions on 
                                                          
 16. 22 U.S.C. § 7102(8)(A) (2006) (defining sex trafficked minors as victims of 
“severe forms of trafficking in persons”); see also ALISON SISKIN & LIANA SUN WYLER, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34317, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS:  U.S. POLICY AND ISSUES FOR 
CONGRESS 21 (2010) (relaying the consensus that prostitution by minors fits the 
TVPA’s definition of “severe forms of human trafficking”).  Although the TVPA also 
covers labor trafficking, this Comment is concerned exclusively with sex trafficking. 
 17. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (declaring that federal law “shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land”). 
 18. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 550–51 (2001) (finding 
certain Massachusetts cigarette advertising regulations preempted by the Federal 
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act because they would “upset federal legislative 
choices”). 
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prostitution.  This has partially changed in recent years, however, as 
growing awareness of sex trafficking has led some states to reconsider 
how their prostitution laws apply to minors.19  Legislation in only a 
small number of states now protect some minors against prosecution 
for prostitution, in many cases, mandating diversion to social services 
instead.20  Nevertheless, the traditional model, in which prostituted 
minors are viewed as offenders, remains the status quo in most 
jurisdictions in America.21 
1. Prostituted minors are considered offenders under the traditional criminal 
 model 
Prostitution is a crime in every state,22 with the partial exception of 
Nevada, where prostitution is permitted in certain licensed 
establishments.23  The vast majority of states do not discriminate 
between adults and minors in defining and enforcing the crime.24  As 
a result, minors in these states are subject to criminal or delinquency 
penalties for engaging in commercial sex acts.25  Minors who fall 
under the age limit specified by a state’s delinquency statute are 
ordinarily adjudicated in family or juvenile court proceedings.26  
                                                          
 19. See infra Part I.A.2 (discussing Safe Harbor laws); see also Pending State and 
Federal Legislation, POLARIS PROJECT, http://www.polarisproject.org/what-we-
do/policy-advocacy/pending-legislation (last visited Aug. 20, 2012) (tracking the 
progress of pending trafficking legislation in every state as legislatures reassess the 
prostitution of minors). 
 20. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.093 subdiv. 1 (West Supp. 2011) (effective Aug. 1, 
2014) (providing diversion services for any sexually exploited youth who has not 
been previously adjudicated for engaging in prostitution).  Diversion programs allow 
people arrested on criminal charges to avoid jail by attending education or 
counseling sessions that aim to divert them from reoffending.  Randall G. Shelden, 
Detention Diversion Advocacy:  An Evaluation, JUV. JUSTICE BULL., Sept 1999, at 1. 
 21. See infra Part I.A.1 (discussing laws that criminalize prostitution without 
reference to age). 
 22. See Franklin, supra note 13, at 356–57 (explaining that states determine their 
own prostitution laws). 
 23. NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.354 (2007) (imposing no penalty for prostitution in 
licensed establishments). 
 24. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.2(1) (1985) (defining prostitution without 
reference to age).  But see MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.448 (2009) (defining prostitution 
as an offense committed by individuals over the age of sixteen). 
 25. See Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, 
Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1 (2010) 
[hereinafter Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking Hearing] (statement of Rep. Robert C. 
Scott, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec.) (noting 
that minors are often arrested for prostitution and as a result do not receive the 
services they need); Francine T. Sherman & Lisa Goldblatt Grace, The System Response 
to the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Girls, in JUVENILE JUSTICE:  ADVANCING RESEARCH, 
POLICY, AND PRACTICE 331, 343 (Francine T. Sherman & Francine H. Jacobs eds., 
2011) (asserting that the criminal law model has harmful long term effects on 
prostituted minors). 
 26. See HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, 
JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS:  2006 NATIONAL REPORT 103 (2006), available at 
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These age limits vary by state and range from fifteen- to seventeen-
years-old.27  Minors who do not qualify for delinquency proceedings 
are processed in criminal court as adults.28  Although the juvenile 
justice system theoretically focuses on rehabilitation and 
individualized justice,29 dispositions for prostituted minors in juvenile 
court do not greatly differ from that in criminal court.30  For 
example, in a typical jurisdiction, dispositional options for juveniles 
and offenders in criminal court both include probation, detention, 
or conditional dismissal pending good behavior.31 
Although minors in most states are subject to the same criminal 
prostitution laws to which adults are subject, the rationale for 
maintaining criminal penalties for minors may be different.  
Traditionally, courts have upheld criminal prohibitions of 
prostitution on the grounds that they are rationally related to the 
protection of public health, morals, and general welfare, and are thus 
                                                          
http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/nr2006/downloads/NR2006.pdf (listing the oldest 
age for original juvenile court jurisdiction set by state statutes). 
 27. Id.; see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1501(7) (2011) (defining a delinquent 
juvenile as a person under the age of sixteen-years-old who commits a crime); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 39-13-513(d) (2011) (defining a legal minor as under the age of 
eighteen-years-old). 
 28. See Tamar R. Birckhead, The “Youngest Profession”:  Consent, Autonomy, and 
Prostituted Children, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1055, 1059 (2011) (lamenting that 
prosecutorial discretion is the only factor limiting whether minors are prosecuted for 
prostitution offenses in many states); Brittle, supra note 6, at 1343–44 (explaining 
that state statutes specify the age at which the juvenile justice system will no longer 
have original jurisdiction over a minor). 
 29. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 26, at 94 (explaining that concerns about 
improving child welfare were central to the original concept of juvenile justice). 
 30. See M. ALEXIS KENNEDY & NICOLE JOEY PUCCI, SHARED HOPE INT’L, LAS VEGAS 
ASSESSMENT:  IDENTIFICATION OF DOMESTIC MINOR SEX TRAFFICKING VICTIMS AND THEIR 
ACCESS TO SERVICES 2, 7–8 (2007), available at http://www.sharedhope.org/ 
Portals/0/Documents/LasVegas_PrinterFriendly.pdf (noticing that prostituted 
minors in Las Vegas spend an average of seventeen days in detention before being 
adjudicated); SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 26, at 96–97 (recognizing increasing 
similarities between the criminal and juvenile systems since the 1990s); Christianna 
M. Lamb, The Child Witness and the Law:  The United States’ Judicial Response to the 
Commercial, Sexual Exploitation of Children in Light of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, 3 OR. REV. INT’L L. 63, 82 (2001) (describing juvenile courts as essentially 
punitive institutions); see also Sherman & Grace, supra note 25, at 331 (providing an 
anecdote about a commercially sexually exploited fifteen-year-old who was charged 
as a delinquent and spent months in detention). 
 31. See Courtney Bryan, Representing and Defending Victims of Commercial Sexual 
Exploitation in Criminal Court, in LAWYER’S MANUAL ON HUMAN TRAFFICKING:  PURSUING 
JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS 183, 184 (Jill Laurie Goodman & Dorchen A. Leidholdt eds., 
2011) (relaying that prostitution cases are referred to as “dispos” (“disposables”) in 
criminal court jargon because they are considered trivial and are often disposed of at 
arraignment with conditional dispositions or pleas); Shelby Schwartz, Note, Harboring 
Concerns:  The Problematic Conceptual Reorientation of Juvenile Prostitution Adjudication in 
New York, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 235, 243 (2008) (describing typical dispositions 
for prostituted minors in New York family court as including placement in a facility 
or probation). 
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legitimate exercises of the states’ police powers.32  While states may 
argue that the purpose of penalizing prostituted minors is to promote 
those interests,33 alternative justifications for criminalizing 
prostitution are commonly proffered in the context of minors.34  For 
example, some argue that the threat of prosecution should be used to 
negotiate minors’ cooperation in the prosecution of pimps and 
traffickers.35  An alternative argument centers on the idea that arrest 
and prosecution provide protection for prostituted minors by 
keeping them off the streets and away from their pimps and 
traffickers,36 and by linking them with service providers.37 
Regardless of the justification, enforcing criminal prostitution law 
against minors is inconsistent with statutory rape laws38 in some states 
                                                          
 32. See, e.g., State v. Hicks, 360 A.2d 150, 152 (Del. Super. Ct. 1976) (determining 
that the state had a rational basis for prohibiting prostitution because it could 
reasonably conclude that prostitution puts a strain on marriage, increases incidences 
of disease, and forces unwanted solicitation on some members of the community), 
aff’d per curiam, 373 A.2d 205 (Del. 1977). 
 33. See Megan Annitto, Consent, Coercion, and Compassion:  Emerging Legal Responses 
to the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Minors, 30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 26–28 (2011) 
(linking the justification of moral wrongdoing to a misperception of the level of 
coercion involved in the sex trafficking of minors). 
 34. See id. at 27 & n.116 (noting that opponents of New York’s Safe Harbor Act 
argued in favor of prosecuting prostituted minors because it is a way to protect them 
from further exploitative pimps and to encourage them to “provide information 
against [their] pimp”); Birckhead, supra note 28, at 1083–84 (noting that advocates 
of enforcement against prostituted minors assert that criminal detention and the 
threat of criminal detention are necessary tools to ensure minors’ cooperation). 
 35. See Birckhead, supra note 28, at 1084 (reporting that those who support the 
prosecution of prostituted minors believe that it is necessary to encourage their 
cooperation, but rejecting this justification because it ignores the evidence about the 
complex psychological effects of trafficking on minors and the dependency it 
engenders); Bob Herbert, Op-Ed., The Wrong Target, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/19/opinion/19herbert.html (describing how 
New York prosecutors objected to an early effort to pass Safe Harbor legislation by 
arguing that the threat of jail was necessary to convince prostituted minors to testify 
against pimps). 
 36. See SHARED HOPE INT’L ET AL., REPORT FROM THE U.S. MID-TERM REVIEW ON THE 
COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN IN AMERICA 15 (2006), available at 
http://www.sharedhope.org/Portals/0/Documents/US_MTR_of_CSEC.PDF 
[hereinafter SHARED HOPE REPORT FROM THE U.S. MID-TERM REVIEW] (describing 
advocates’ concerns about releasing minors back to pimps or abusive family 
relationships). 
 37. See Birckhead, supra note 28, at 1085 (presenting the argument that without 
these tools, courts have no way to ensure victims receive treatment and counseling); 
Geneva O. Brown, Little Girl Lost:  Las Vegas Metro Police Vice Division and the Use of 
Material Witness Holds Against Teenaged Prostitutes, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 471, 471–74, 
496–501 (2008) (describing a Las Vegas police practice of using material witness 
holds to detain prostituted minors and the police and prosecutors’ defense of the 
practice as beneficial to the safety of the prostituted minors). 
 38. See ASAPH GLOSSER ET AL., THE LEWIN GRP., STATUTORY RAPE:  A GUIDE TO STATE 
LAWS AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 6–7 (2004), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/ 
hsp/08/SR/StateLaws/report.pdf (cataloguing state age of consent laws, with the 
average age of consent being sixteen-years-old).  Statutory rape laws make it illegal to 
engage in sexual activity with individuals below a certain age.  Id. at 5.  The principle 
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because it allows minors to be prosecuted for engaging in 
commercial sex even though they are legally unable to consent to 
sex.39  In 2010, the Texas Supreme Court held that this dichotomy 
was untenable.40  The Texas court drew on recent U.S. Supreme 
Court cases, like Roper v. Simmons41 and Graham v. Florida,42 in 
declaring that, with regard to prostitution, “minors of a certain age 
have a reduced or nonexistent capacity to consent, no matter their 
actual agreement or capacity.”43  While the Texas court’s decision 
effectively eliminated criminal liability for prostituted minors under 
that state’s age of consent,44 some other states have recently enacted 
legislation with similar effects.45 
2. Safe Harbor laws redefine prostituted minors as victims in need of services 
Since the passage of the federal TVPA, ten states have enacted 
some form of legislation limiting the criminal liability of minors who 
are arrested for prostitution46:  Connecticut,47 Illinois,48 
                                                          
underlying such laws is that individuals below a certain age are not mature enough to 
consent to sex.  Id. at 2.  Thus, these laws assume that statutory rape is coercive even 
when both parties voluntarily engage in the sex act.  Id. 
 39. See Birckhead, supra note 28, at 1069–70 (discussing the tension between the 
two types of laws and noting that the purpose of statutory rape laws is to deter sex 
that is not truly consensual).  Courts are not in agreement about the significance of 
this dichotomy.  Compare In re B.W., 313 S.W.3d 818, 820 (Tex. 2010) (holding that a 
thirteen-year-old could not be prosecuted for prostitution because she was under the 
age of consent), with In re Nicolette R., 779 N.Y.S.2d 487, 488 (App. Div. 2004) 
(permitting a prostitution adjudication in juvenile court despite the fact that the 
juvenile was age twelve and thus under the age of consent). 
 40. See In re B.W., 313 S.W.3d at 820 (reasoning that because children thirteen 
and younger cannot consent to sex under Texas law, they also cannot be tried for 
prostitution under Texas law). 
 41. 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005) (holding that minors should not be eligible for the 
death penalty because eighteen is the age at which “society draws the line for many 
purposes between childhood and adulthood”). 
 42. 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (interpreting the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause to that mean juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses 
cannot be sentenced to life without parole); see also Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct 2455, 
2464 (2012) (holding that a mandatory sentence of life without parole for those who 
were under age eighteen at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth 
Amendment). 
 43. In re B.W., 313 S.W.3d at 823. 
 44. See id. at 826 (inferring an exception in the criminal prostitution law for 
minors under the age of consent because the statutory rape law indicates the 
legislature has decided that children under the age of consent lack the mental 
capacity to meaningfully agree to sex). 
 45. See infra Part I.A.2 (discussing ten states’ attempts to create legislation with 
the goal of providing services to prostituted minors instead of punishment). 
 46. See Pending State and Federal Legislation, supra note 19 (providing information 
on enacted trafficking legislation and daily updates on pending trafficking legislation 
in every state).  This progress has not come without opposition.  See, e.g., Kyle 
Wingfield, Sex Trade Kids Truly Victims, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 7, 2010, at A22 
(noting that opposition groups have frustrated the passage of a Georgia Safe Harbor 
bill).  Hawaii is also considering a bill that would establish that a person who is under 
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Massachusetts,49 Michigan,50 Minnesota,51 New York,52 Ohio,53 
Tennessee,54 Vermont,55 and Washington56.  These laws, which are 
often referred to as Safe Harbor laws,57 vary in scope; however, each 
requires that some category of prostituted minors be removed from 
delinquency or criminal court proceedings and diverted instead to 
social services, such as psychological counseling or long-term 
housing.58 
Safe Harbor laws contain different age requirements.  For example, 
the law in Illinois states that a minor under age eighteen is immune 
                                                          
eighteen and charged with a prostitution offense is immune from prosecution.  H.R. 
2234 H.D. 1, 26th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2012). 
 47. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-82 (2012) (redefining prostitution as an offense 
committed by an individual sixteen years of age or older and creating a rebuttable 
presumption that sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds did not consent to engage in the 
offense). 
 48. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-14(d) (2012) (transferring jurisdiction over 
prostituted minors from the criminal justice system to child protective services). 
 49. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 39L (2012) (creating a presumption that a person 
under age eighteen who engages in prostitution should be treated as a child in need 
of protective services rather than be prosecuted). 
 50. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.448–.449 (2009) (defining prostitution as a crime 
committed by individuals over the age of sixteen).  Unlike other states that have 
enacted laws that eliminate criminal punishment for some prostituted minors, 
Michigan does not require that prostituted minors be diverted to service providers or 
alternative programs. 
 51. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.093 subdiv. 1 (West Supp. 2011) (effective Aug. 1, 
2014) (requiring that prostituted sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds be diverted to 
specialized programs rather than be adjudicated as a delinquent). 
 52. N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §§ 447-a to -b (McKinney 2010) (authorizing services for 
sexually exploited youth); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 732 (stating that juveniles arrested for 
prostitution can be declared a “person . . . in need of supervision”).  The New York 
law is titled the “Safe Harbour Act.”  Although the New York legislature chose to use 
“harbour,” the English spelling of “harbor,”  N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 447-a, I use 
“harbor” throughout this Comment. 
 53. H.R. 262, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011) (authorizing juvenile 
courts to suspend a complaint pending the child’s completion of diversion actions if 
the alleged delinquent child is charged with prostitution). 
 54. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-513(d) (2011) (mandating that persons under age 
eighteen are immune from prosecution for prostitution as a juvenile or adult and 
shall be placed under temporary protective custody). 
 55. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 2652(c)(1), 2653(a)(1) (2011) (defining people 
who are under eighteen and engaged in prostitution as victims of aggravated human 
trafficking and providing them with immunity against prostitution charges). 
 56. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.070(7) (2012) (providing for diversion from 
delinquency proceedings for minors alleged to have committed their first 
prostitution offense). 
 57. Not all of the laws discussed in this section are named “Safe Harbor.”  I use 
the term here to identity a category of laws that limit criminal responsibility and 
increase provision of services for prostituted minors. 
 58. See Human Trafficking Legislative Issue Brief:  Sex Trafficking of Minors and “Safe 
Harbor,” POLARIS PROJECT 1 (Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.polarisproject.org/ 
storage/documents/policy_documents/Issue_Briefs/issue%20brief%20-
%20safe%20harbor%20-%20april%202012.pdf (listing non-prosecution and 
provision of services as components of a comprehensive Safe Harbor law and citing 
examples of existing Safe Harbor laws). 
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from prosecution and should receive specialized services instead.59  
On the other hand, Connecticut immunizes minors under sixteen 
from prosecution and creates a presumption that minors age sixteen 
and seventeen are coerced into committing the offense.60   
In addition to age,61 some states also condition their laws’ 
protections on factors such as previous offenses62 or cooperation with 
service providers.63  For example, although Minnesota and 
Washington require that certain minors arrested for prostitution be 
referred to diversion programs rather than receive criminal 
punishments, these protections are only mandatory for first time 
offenders.64  Likewise, New York’s protections are mandatory only if 
the minor has not previously offended, cooperates with service 
                                                          
 59. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-14(d) (2012) (transferring jurisdiction over 
prostituted minors from the criminal justice system to child protective services). 
 60. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-82 (2012). 
 61. The age element is even more complicated under New York’s Act.  The New 
York law defines a minor under age eighteen involved in prostitution as a “sexually 
exploited child” and authorizes the provision of services for people meeting this 
definition.  N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §§ 447-a to -b (McKinney 2010).  In addition, it 
mandates non-prosecution of some minors by creating a presumption that a 
respondent brought to family court on charges of prostitution should be considered 
a “person in need of supervision” and not a delinquent.  N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 
311.4(3).  New York’s family court jurisdiction, however, only extends to minors 
under age sixteen.  Id. § 301.2(1).  As such, the Act effectively only mandates 
protection for prostituted minors under age sixteen.  See Annitto, supra note 33, at 
46–47 (noting the legislature’s rejection of an earlier version of the New York law 
that contained language that would have protected all minors under age eighteen).  
At least one New York court has interpreted the Safe Harbor Act’s non-prosecution 
protection as extending to sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds as well.  In People v. 
Samantha R., No. 2011KN092555, 2011 WL 6303402 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Dec. 16, 2011), 
the court decided sua sponte to dismiss a sixteen-year-old defendant’s criminal 
prostitution charge, reasoning that the Safe Harbor law implies that criminal courts 
should transfer prostitution cases to family court when the defendants are under age 
eighteen.  Id. at *4.  The court noted that while the Act did not alter the penal law, 
the prosecution of a minor, seen as a “sexually exploited child” and a “victim” within 
the courts and legislature, is incompatible with the ameliorative intent of the Safe 
Harbor Act, state trafficking laws, and the TVPA.  Id. at *3–4. 
 62. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.093 subdiv. 1(a) (West Supp. 2011) (effective 
Aug. 1, 2014) (describing circumstances that disqualify a minor for protection 
against prosecution); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 311.4(3) (granting discretion to continue a 
delinquency proceeding if the minor previously committed an act of prostitution). 
 63. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 311.4(3) (stating that a court is not required to 
divert a case if the youth is unwilling to cooperate with service providers). 
 64. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.093 subdiv. (1)(a)(1) (applying the first-time-
offense procedure where the sixteen- or seventeen-year-old was not previously 
adjudicated delinquent for engaging in prostitution); WASH. REV. CODE § 
13.40.070(6)–(7) (2012) (instructing the prosecutor to divert the case if it is the 
defendant’s first offense).  Conditions like these have been criticized as failing to 
account for prostituted minors’ circumstances and the dynamics of pimp control.  See 
Annitto, supra note 33, at 51–52 (evaluating the weaknesses of New York’s Safe 
Harbor law as illustrated by a case involving a prostituted minor who was denied the 
benefit of the law’s non-prosecution provision because the minor had a prior arrest). 
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providers, and has never been the subject of a “person in need of 
supervision” petition in family court.65 
In summary, although some states have begun to recognize the 
prostitution of minors as distinct from that of adults, the relatively 
progressive schemes adopted in these states still allow for the 
prosecution of some prostituted minors.  Moreover, Safe Harbor laws 
exist in only ten states,66 while the vast majority continues to 
criminalize prostitution for minors.67  As a result, many minors who 
are considered victims under federal law are nevertheless considered 
offenders under state laws. 
B. The Trafficking Victims Protection Act 
While there is no federal prostitution statute,68 the federal 
government has taken a dominant role in fighting sex trafficking.69  
The central piece of federal sex trafficking legislation, the TVPA, was 
enacted in 2000 and has since been reauthorized three times.70  
Federal authority to regulate sex trafficking stems from the 
Commerce Clause.71  The purpose of the TVPA is to combat 
trafficking in persons by ensuring punishment of traffickers and 
protection for trafficking victims.72  When the TVPA initially passed in 
2000, Congress’s focus was international trafficking.73  However, 
                                                          
 65. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 311.4(3) (listing factors that render ineffective the 
statutorily authorized presumption that a prostituted minor is a victim of sex 
trafficking); In re Bobby P., 907 N.Y.S.2d 540, 547–49 (Fam. Ct. 2010) (refusing to 
convert a minor’s prostitution case from a delinquency case to a “person in need of 
supervision” case because the court doubted the minor’s willingness to embrace 
court-ordered services). 
 66. See supra notes 52–56 (citing various state prostitution statutes that exempt 
minors). 
 67. See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing the traditional age-indiscriminate approach to 
enforcing prostitution laws). 
 68. See Franklin, supra note 13, at 364 (explaining that primary authority for 
regulating prostitution has traditionally been thought to lie with the states). 
 69. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 374–78 (2011) 
[hereinafter 2011 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT] (highlighting the primacy of the 
federal government in the United States’ efforts to combat trafficking). 
 70. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (codified in scattered sections of 6, 8, 18, 
22, and 42 U.S.C. (Supp. II 2009)); Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization 
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-164, 119 Stat. 3558 (2006); Trafficking Victims 
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193, 117 Stat. 2875. 
 71. See United States v. Powell, No. 04 CR 885, 2006 WL 1155947, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 
Apr. 28, 2006) (concluding that in enacting the TVPA, Congress found that 
trafficking adversely affects interstate commerce, and as such, the government need 
not prove interstate travel to satisfy the interstate commerce element in a trafficking 
case). 
 72. See 22 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (2006) (describing human trafficking as a 
“contemporary manifestation of slavery”). 
 73. Id. § 7101(b) (referring to characteristics of international trafficking); see also 
Birckhead, supra note 28, at 1078 (describing the international focus of the TVPA as 
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nothing in the text of the 2000 Act prevents its application to U.S. 
citizens.74  Indeed, subsequent reauthorizations of the TVPA 
explicitly acknowledge that Congress considers domestic and 
international trafficking equally criminal and that the protective 
provisions of the Act apply with equal force to both foreign and U.S. 
citizen victims.75 
The TVPA provisions fall into three categories:  punishment, 
prevention, and protection.76  Under the punishment category, the 
Act strengthened available prosecution and sentencing statutory 
mechanisms77 and made it a crime to engage in sex trafficking that 
constitutes a “severe form[] of trafficking in persons.”78  In 
                                                          
reflecting a deep disconnect between treatment of foreign born and “domestic” 
trafficking victims); Jennifer M. Chacón, Misery and Myopia:  Understanding the Failures 
of U.S. Efforts to Stop Human Trafficking, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2977, 2990 (2006) 
(suggesting that Congress’s initial lack of attention to domestic trafficking is 
indicative of a broader tendency to ignore the role of the United States in 
perpetuating trafficking). 
 74. See Annitto, supra note 33, at 40 (noting that the language of the original 
TVPA technically applied to domestic minor trafficking victims); Birckhead, supra 
note 28, at 1079 (observing that the TVPA’s language makes no distinction between 
foreign and domestic victims and the legislative history indicates that many of the 
Act’s sponsors understood it to apply to domestic victims); see also 146 CONG. REC. 
16,705 (2000) (statement of Sen. Paul Wellstone) (explaining that the 2000 TVPA 
was designed in part to enhance domestic anti-trafficking efforts). 
 75. See Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005 § 2(4)–(6) 
(finding that trafficking exists within the United States); H.R. REP. NO. 109-317, pt. 1, 
at 11 (2005) (defining domestic trafficking as the “trafficking of United States 
citizens and permanent residents”); H.R. REP. NO. 109-317, pt. 2, at 22 (explaining 
that state and local programs funded pursuant to the TVPA should improve services 
to domestic minor trafficking victims to eliminate any inconsistency in the provision 
of services to foreign and domestic trafficking victims); Angela D. Giampolo, The 
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005:  The Latest Weapon in the Fight 
Against Human Trafficking, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 195, 210–11 (2006) 
(describing how the 2005 reauthorization of the TVPA aims to improve services for 
domestic trafficking victims, including establishing a grant program to strengthen 
state and local responses to victims). 
 76. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-487, pt. 2, at 1 (2000) (describing the ways in which the 
federal government combats sex trafficking and dividing its approach into three 
prongs:  prevention of trafficking, punishment of traffickers, and protection of 
victims); Theodore R. Sangalis, Comment, Elusive Empowerment:  Compensating the Sex 
Trafficked Person Under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 403, 
405 (2011) (suggesting that the federal government has struggled in practice to 
balance the three objectives of sex trafficking legislation).  The prevention prong of 
the TVPA is not discussed in the Comment.  Provisions falling under this category 
include a call for establishing a system for monitoring worldwide anti-trafficking 
efforts, and authorization for the establishment of programs in foreign countries to 
increase public awareness of trafficking and to provide economic opportunities to 
potential victims to deter trafficking.  See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 7104(a)–(b) (directing the 
President to aid victims of international trafficking internationally and promote 
public awareness). 
 77. See Rosy Kandathil, Global Sex Trafficking and the Trafficking Victims Protection 
Act of 2000:  Legislative Responses to the Problem of Modern Slavery, 12 MICH. J. GENDER & 
L. 87, 98 (2005) (explaining that the TVPA enhanced sentences for crimes such as 
kidnapping and sexual abuse when those crimes occur in the course of trafficking). 
 78. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (prohibiting sex trafficking of children or sex trafficking 
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particular, the Act makes it a crime to cause a person to engage in a 
commercial sex act either (1) through the use of “force, fraud, or 
coercion” or (2) where the person induced to perform the 
commercial sex act is under eighteen years of age.79  Congress 
identified two different forms of “severe” sex trafficking80 indicating 
that it considered sex trafficking of minors qualitatively different than 
sex trafficking of adults.81 
While Congress requires proof of compulsion to establish sex 
trafficking of an adult, it does not require proof of compulsion when 
the victim is a minor.82  Similarly, under the TVPA, minors who 
engage in commercial sex are categorically defined as victims of 
severe sex trafficking.83  In defining “victim of severe sex trafficking,” 
Congress again made a distinction—this time implicitly—between 
minors and adults by requiring proof of compulsion for adult victims 
but not minor victims.84  Since the TVPA aims to protect victims of 
                                                          
by force, fraud, or coercion).  The types of conduct made criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 
1591 constitute “severe forms of trafficking” under 22 U.S.C. § 7102(8)(A).  See Janie 
A. Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking from Ideological Capture:  Prostitution Reform and Anti-
Trafficking Law and Policy, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1655, 1679 (2010) (explaining that the 
TVPA’s “key operational terms” only apply to sex trafficking that qualifies as a “severe 
form of trafficking in persons”).  The TVPA defines only some forms of sex 
trafficking as “severe.”  Compare 22 U.S.C. § 7102(8)(A) (defining “severe” forms of 
sex trafficking as sex trafficking of children or by force, fraud, or coercion), with id. § 
7102(9) (defining sex trafficking as “the recruitment, harboring, transportation, 
provision, or obtaining of a person for the purpose of a commercial sex act”). 
 79. 22 U.S.C. § 7102(8)(A). 
 80. The term “severe sex trafficking” does not appear in the Code.  I use the 
term to refer to the two forms of sex trafficking defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1591 and 
identified in 22 U.S.C. § 7102(8)(A). 
 81. See Robert Uy, Blinded by Red Lights:  Why Trafficking Discourse Should Shift Away 
from Sex and the “Perfect Victim” Paradigm, 26 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 204, 205–06 
(2011) (describing the TVPA’s “clear distinction” between trafficking of adults and 
minors as resulting from the view that minors cannot, under any circumstances, 
consent to commercial sex). 
 82. See 22 U.S.C. § 7102(8)(A) (requiring either force, fraud, or coercion, or the 
inducement of a person under the age of eighteen to commit severe sex trafficking); 
see also Pamela Chen & Monica Ryan, Federal Prosecution of Human Traffickers, in 
LAWYER’S MANUAL ON HUMAN TRAFFICKING:  PURSUING JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS 271, 273 
(Jill Laurie Goodman & Dorchen A. Leidholdt eds., 2011) (emphasizing the fact that 
compulsion is not required to prove sex trafficking of a minor). 
 83. See 22 U.S.C. § 7102(8A), (13) (categorizing children involved in commercial 
sex acts as victims of severe sex trafficking, regardless of whether force, fraud, or 
coercion was used against them); see also In Our Own Backyard, supra note 1, at 2 
(statement of Sen. Richard Durbin, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Human Rights & the 
Law) (declaring that Congress intended the TVPA to treat all children who were 
involved in commercial sex crimes as victims); H.R. REP. NO. 109-317, pt. 2, at 23 
(2005) (affirming that any person younger than eighteen-years-old who is induced to 
perform a commercial sex act is considered a victim of severe trafficking under the 
TVPA); SISKIN & WYLER, supra note 16, at 21 (finding widespread acceptance of the 
proposition that all prostitution by minors constitutes severe sex trafficking under 
the TVPA). 
 84. See 22 U.S.C. § 7102(13).  The TVPA defines a victim of a severe form of 
trafficking with reference to the disjunctive definition of severe forms of trafficking 
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severe sex trafficking,85 it directs the DOJ to issue regulations for 
federal law enforcement personnel and immigration officials 
regarding, for example, the need to provide security if a victim’s 
safety is at risk;86 the need to refrain from holding victims in custody 
in a manner inappropriate in light of their status as victims;87 and the 
need to ensure that they have access to information about their rights 
as victims of crime.88 
The Act also provides two types of immigration relief for foreign 
trafficking victims:  first, it authorizes the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) to allow the continued presence of some victims of 
trafficking in the United States,89 and second, it authorizes 
regulations to create the T visa, which grants status to victims of 
trafficking for a four-year period and can be adjusted to permanent 
residency after that period to allow for further immigration relief.90  
In addition, the TVPA instructs the Department of Health and 
Human Services, the Department of Labor, the Legal Services 
Corporation, and various other federal agencies to expand benefits 
and services for victims of severe sex trafficking.91  Victim assistance 
funded pursuant to these provisions includes medical care, mental 
health treatment, shelter, translation and interpretation, immigration 
and legal assistance, and other services.92  Finally, the TVPA creates a 
civil remedy93 for trafficking victims that entitles them to restitution.94 
                                                          
in persons found in 22 U.S.C. § 7102(8). 
 85. See, e.g., id. § 7101(b)(19) (establishing that victims of severe sex trafficking 
should not be punished for unlawful acts committed solely as a result of being 
trafficked); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 
AND ASSESSMENT OF U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES TO COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 
FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 9 (2011) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 2010 REPORT], 
available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/annualreports/tr2010/agreporthuman 
trafficking2010.pdf (describing federal agencies’ activities pursuant to the TVPA as 
providing support and services for victims, such as shelter options and rehabilitation 
programs). 
 86. 22 U.S.C. § 7105(c)(1)(C). 
 87. Id. § 7105(c)(1)(A). 
 88. Id. § 7105(c)(2). 
 89. See id. § 7105(c)(3) (setting out the circumstances under which a trafficking 
victim can be granted continued presence in the United States, such as the 
participation in an investigation). 
 90. 8 C.F.R. § 214.11(p)(1) (2012). 
 91. See 22 U.S.C. § 7105(b) (requiring heads of agencies to establish various 
programs to provide victims with assistance, benefits, and services). 
 92. SUBCOMM. ON DOMESTIC TRAFFICKING, SENIOR POLICY OPERATING GRP. ON 
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 8–9 (2007) 
[hereinafter SENIOR POLICY OPERATING], available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/ 
trafficking/SPOGReport-Final9-5-07.pdf.  The Senior Policy Operating Group was 
established by TVPA, and certain agencies are mandated to report human trafficking 
initiatives to it.  42 U.S.C. § 14044d. 
 93. 18 U.S.C. § 1595.  The effectiveness of the civil remedy is a separate question.  
See Sangalis, supra note 76, at 405 (arguing that victims have not benefited from the 
civil remedy). 
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Despite the TVPA’s clear indication that minors involved in 
commercial sex are victims and that victims should not be treated as 
criminals, the 2008 reauthorization of the TVPA contains a savings 
clause.95  A savings clause is language in a statute that exempts some 
legal provisions from the displacement that would otherwise occur.96  
In the case of the TVPA, the savings clause states, “[n]othing in this 
Act . . . (1) may be construed to treat prostitution as a valid form of 
employment under Federal law; or (2) shall preempt, supplant, or 
limit the effect of any State or Federal criminal law.”97  Consequently, 
although there is clearly inconsistency between the federal sex 
trafficking law and the status of prostituted minors under state 
criminal prostitution laws, it is not immediately clear what impact the 
TVPA should have on the continued application of state prostitution 
laws to minors. 
C. Federal Preemption of Conflicting State Laws 
One way to evaluate the apparent conflict between federal law and 
state law is using preemption analysis.  Preemption refers to the 
displacement of state law by federal law pursuant to the Supremacy 
Clause of the Constitution, which states that federal law is the 
“supreme Law of the Land.”98  Long-established Supreme Court 
doctrine holds that the “touchstone” of preemption is congressional 
purpose.99  As such, in the clearest instances of preemption, Congress 
expressly indicates its intent to preempt state law in the language of a 
statute;100 however, even when a federal statute does not contain 
                                                          
 94. 18 U.S.C. § 1593(b) (setting the amount payable upon a restitution order as 
“the greater of the gross income or value” to the trafficker of the victim’s services).  
The civil remedy allows a sex trafficking victim to sue his or her trafficker in federal 
court for damages arising from a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591. 
 95. See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 225(a), 122 Stat. 5044, 5072 (foreclosing any 
preemption of state or federal law).  Although this language appears as a note in the 
U.S. Code, it not officially codified therein.  22 U.S.C. § 7101 note (Supp. II 2009). 
 96. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1461 (9th ed. 2009). 
 97.  William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 
2008 § 225(a). 
 98. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 
239–40 (1824) (holding that a state law that granted a monopoly on the operation of 
steamboats in a particular harbor was preempted by a federal statute regulating 
coastal trade). 
 99. E.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485, 490 (1996) (holding that 
Congress enacted a statute for the purpose of enhancing the safety of medical 
devices and that this purpose did not support the petitioners claim that the statute 
preempted state law negligence actions against medical device manufacturers); 
Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516, 519–20 (1992) (holding that the 
purpose of a federal statute regarding tobacco advertising was not to preempt state 
common law claims but rather only positive enactments of state law). 
 100. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990) (explaining that 
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explicit preemption language, courts can infer congressional intent 
to preempt.101 
The Court has recognized two categories of implied preemption:  
field preemption and conflict preemption.102  Field preemption 
occurs when Congress creates a federal scheme “so pervasive” that 
there is “no room” for state law,103 or when the area in which a state 
regulation operates is so dominated by federal interests that a court 
may infer Congress’s intent to regulate exclusively within that field.104  
Conflict preemption, on the other hand, occurs when state and 
federal legislation are in conflict, either because compliance with 
both laws is impossible or because the state law frustrates the federal 
law’s purposes.105  Conflict preemption analysis therefore involves two 
                                                          
preemption is a matter of deciphering congressional intent, and noting that 
sometimes Congress’s intent is explicit); see also Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 
76 (2008) (explaining that express preemption language does not end the 
preemption inquiry because its scope must still be determined). 
 101. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012) (stating that 
Congress’s intent to displace state law can be inferred from a regulatory framework); 
Medtronic, Inc., 518 U.S. at 486 (explaining that congressional intent to preempt is 
inferred not only from text but also “the structure and purpose of the statute as a 
whole”); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984) (distinguishing 
between preemption where Congress expresses its explicit intent to “occupy that 
field” and where the purposes of Congress are in conflict with the purposes of state 
law). 
 102. See Altria Grp., 555 U.S. at 76–77 (noting that in field and conflict preemption 
cases, Congress’s preemptive intent is inferred); English, 496 U.S. at 79 (describing 
the three categories of preemption—express, field, and conflict—but refusing to 
recognize a rigid distinction between them); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 
(1941) (refusing to define a strict formula for determining when state law is 
impliedly preempted). 
 103. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502 (1956) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe 
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
 104. See Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 (reasoning that when a law is “so pervasive,” it is 
inferred that Congress meant to leave no room for state laws); see also United States v. 
Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 99 (2000) (holding that state maritime regulations were 
preempted where the state “enacted legislation in an area where the federal interest 
has been manifest since the beginning of our Republic”); Davidowitz, 312 U.S. at 67–
68 (discerning field preemption based on the federal government’s pervasive scheme 
of immigration regulation); S. Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of Ind., 236 U.S. 439, 447 
(1915) (finding field preemption on the basis of extensive federal regulations of 
freight cars operating in interstate railways). 
 105. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2501 (describing impossibility and 
obstacle preemption as subcategories of conflict preemption); Fla. Lime & Avocado 
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963) (rejecting avocado growers’ 
impossibility claim based on an asserted conflict between state maturity standards 
and federal avocado regulations); McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 137 (1913) 
(concluding that a state syrup labeling law was preempted because its provisions 
conflicted with a federal law); see also Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 651 (1971) 
(finding that an Arizona law governing motor vehicle safety was preempted because 
it conflicted with the Bankruptcy Act); cf. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 
861, 873–74 (2000) (dismissing as unnecessary the artificial division the Court had 
seemingly created in striking down state statutes that conflicted with federal law with 
either an impossibility or frustration of purpose label).  See generally Viet D. Dinh, 
Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085 (2000) (locating conflict 
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steps:  first, ascertaining the proper construction of the federal 
statute, and second, determining whether the state law is in conflict 
with the federal law.106  If the analysis reveals a conflict, the 
Supremacy Clause indicates that federal law trumps state law.107 
1. Step one of conflict preemption analysis:  Statutory interpretation 
The first step of a conflict preemption analysis is to identify the 
meaning or purpose of the federal statute. This is an exercise in 
statutory construction and requires that courts interpret the text and 
the structure of the statute’s provisions,108 and in some cases, the 
statute’s legislative history.109  The Supreme Court has often stated 
that there is a “presumption against preemption” informing the 
inquiry into legislative purpose; however, the presumption is 
inconsistently applied.110  This presumption is an expression of the 
federalism concerns that underlie questions of federal preemption of 
                                                          
preemption on a spectrum of mechanisms by which congressional action or inaction 
displaces state law). 
 106. See Perez, 402 U.S. at 644 (outlining the two steps in a proper implied conflict 
analysis); Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. 
REV. 967, 970 (2002) (noting that conflict preemption is the most controversial of 
the implied preemption models because of the uncertainty involved in the task of 
inferring congressional objectives); Dinh, supra note 105, at 2092 (“[T]he task for 
the Court is to discern what Congress has legislated and whether such legislation 
displaces concurrent state law . . . .”). 
 107. See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (observing that a 
state law in conflict with federal law is “without effect”). 
 108. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,  485–86 (1996) (examining 
the language of the statute, the purpose of the legislation, and the legislative history 
to determine that there was no preemption); Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. 
Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 30, 34–35 (1996) (finding that a federal statute preempts local 
laws because the law contains no indication of Congress’s intent to allow local laws to 
restrict the statute); see also Dinh, supra note 105, at 2104–05 (describing implied 
preemption analysis as a form of statutory construction). 
 109. See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 490 (relying on legislative history to conclude that 
Congress did not intend a federal law regulating medical devices to preempt 
common law negligence actions).  But see Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 583 (2009) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (expressing skepticism at the Court’s “‘purposes and 
objectives’ pre-emption jurisprudence” and especially its reliance on legislative 
history to identify Congress’s purposes). 
 110. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981) (asserting that a 
preemption analysis begins with the presumption that Congress does not intend to 
preempt state law); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) 
(clarifying that there is an assumption that Congress did not intend to preempt the 
states’ police powers absent a clear expression of this intent); see also English v. Gen. 
Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (discussing the need for a clear statement of intent 
when the federal government legislates in a field traditionally occupied by the 
states); Robert R. Gasaway, The Problem of Federal Preemption:  Reformulating the Black 
Letter Rules, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 25, 35 (2005) (describing the presumption against 
preemption as one of three black letter rules of preemption doctrine).  But see 
generally Davis, supra note 106 (arguing that although the Court has long referred to 
the presumption against preemption, its decisions reflect a presumption in favor of 
preemption). 
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state law.111  It presumes that Congress does not intend to preempt 
state law, especially when it legislates in an area that states 
traditionally occupy.112  On the other hand, the Supreme Court has 
suggested that the presumption against preemption does not apply 
when the state law in question regulates an area where the federal 
government already has a strong regulatory presence.113 As such, the 
presumption should only apply when Congress legislates in an area of 
law traditionally within the states’ police powers. 
In practice, the presumption against preemption is applied 
inconsistently.114  For example, the Supreme Court has upheld 
findings of preemption in such zones of traditional state authority as 
domestic relations,115 products liability law,116 cigarette advertising,117 
and insurance regulation.118  This record has led some scholars to 
suggest that the Supreme Court’s decisions, if not its words, reveal a 
presumption in favor of preemption.119  Moreover, regardless of the 
                                                          
 111. See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485 (explaining that the presumption reflects respect for 
the states as “independent sovereigns in our federal system”); Davis, supra note 106, 
at 968 (suggesting that commentators approve of the presumption because it is 
consistent with federalism principles). 
 112. See, e.g., Hillsborough County. v. Automated Med. Labs, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 
715 (1985) (noting that health and safety standards are considered state matters); 
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979) (recognizing that laws regarding 
domestic relations are traditionally a matter of state authority). 
 113. See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106 (2000) (insisting that a state 
is not entitled to a presumption against preemption for laws regulating maritime 
commerce); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67–68 (1941) (considering it 
significant that the preempted state legislation concerned international relations, an 
area in which the national government is considered to have plenary power). 
 114. See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 545–49 (1977) (Rehnquist, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing for stronger adherence to the 
presumption against preemption); City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 
411 U.S. 624, 643 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (referring to the presumption in 
arguing that a city ordinance prohibiting jets from taking off during certain hours 
was valid because it should have been preempted by federal regulations); see also 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters:  A Different Approach to 
Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1318–24 (2004) (arguing that in practice the 
Court often applies a presumption in favor of preemption); Dinh, supra note 105, at 
2086 (citing cases where dissenting justices have accused the majority of ignoring the 
presumption against preemption). 
 115. See McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 235–36 (1981) (holding that a federal 
military retirement scheme preempted state community property rules in a dispute 
concerning division of assets upon divorce). 
 116. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000) (deciding that a 
plaintiff’s no-airbag lawsuit against a car manufacturer could not go forward because 
federal vehicle safety regulations preempted the state tort claims). 
 117. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 550–51 (2001) (ruling that 
federal law preempted a Massachusetts law regulating certain cigarette advertising). 
 118. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 420–23 (2003) (finding 
preemption of a California law that required insurance companies to disclose 
Holocaust-era insurance policies). 
 119. See Davis, supra note 106, at 1013 (arguing that the Supreme Court has 
surreptitiously impacted state tort law in part by misrepresenting the presumption 
against preemption).  But see David C. Vladeck, Deconstructing Wyeth v. Levine:  The 
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Supreme Court’s actual practice, scholars have expressed doubt 
about whether the presumption against preemption is ever 
appropriate in the specific context of conflict preemption.120  One 
scholar suggests that when a conflict exists between a validly enacted 
federal law and a state law, a court would “disrupt the constitutional 
division of power” if it were to “favor one result over another” by 
applying a presumption against preemption.121  Similarly, a recent 
opinion in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing122 suggested that the presumption 
should not apply in cases of actual conflicts between federal and state 
laws because the Supremacy Clause “plainly contemplates” conflict 
preemptions.123  Thus, although the Court frequently refers to the 
presumption against preemption, its force in any given case is not 
obvious. 
The effect of a savings clause is another element courts frequently 
encounter in the statutory interpretation stage of conflict preemption 
analysis.  In the context of preemption, savings clauses preserve the 
effect of state laws that otherwise would be preempted by operation 
of the Supremacy Clause.124  The Supreme Court, however, has 
inferred conflict preemption even in cases where a federal statute 
contains a savings clause.125  For example, in Geier v. American Honda 
Motor Co.,126 a woman injured in a car crash sued the automobile 
manufacturer, claiming it was negligent in failing to equip its cars 
                                                          
New Limits on Implied Conflict Preemption, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 883, 886 (2009) 
(contending that recent Supreme Court decisions reflect greater adherence to the 
presumption against preemption). 
 120. See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2579–80 (2011) (plurality 
opinion) (arguing that the Supremacy Clause anticipates conflict preemption, and 
therefore, the presumption against preemption is unwarranted in cases of direct 
conflicts between federal and state law); Dinh, supra note 105, at 2105 (arguing that 
the Court’s reasoning in Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988), suggests that the 
presumption against preemption should not apply in cases where state law stands as 
an obstacle to the accomplishment of federal objectives). 
 121. See Dinh, supra note 105, at 2092 (writing that the Constitution and the 
structure of American federalism do not permit the wholesale application of a 
presumption against preemption). 
 122. 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011). 
 123. See id. at 2579–80 (plurality opinion) (stating that the Framers understood 
the Supremacy Clause to contain a “non-obstante” clause directing courts when to 
disregard the traditional presumption against implied repeals, and as such, courts 
“should not strain to find ways to reconcile federal law with seemingly conflicting 
state law”).  Justice Kennedy did not join this part of the opinion.  As such, this part 
of the opinion did not garner a majority of the Court. 
 124. See Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1978 (2011) (holding 
that an Arizona law was not preempted by a federal immigration law because it fell 
within the meaning of a savings clause in the federal law that preserved states’ 
options to enact licensing laws that impose sanctions for immigration violations). 
 125. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 865 (2000) (finding that 
despite a savings clause, the contested federal act preempts state safety regulations). 
 126. 529 U.S. 861 (2000). 
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with driver-side airbags.127  The Supreme Court held that her state 
tort claim was preempted by federal vehicle safety standards, even 
though the federal law authorizing the regulations contained a 
seemingly broad savings clause.128  The Court explained its decision 
by noting that the existence of a savings clause in a federal statute 
does “not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption 
principles.”129  Instead, the Court explained that the Supremacy 
Clause mandates courts to read federal statutes as preempting those 
state laws that conflict with the federal statute, regardless of whether 
the statute contains a savings clause.130 
The Court recently confirmed this rule in Chamber of Commerce v. 
Whiting.131  In Whiting, the Court found that a provision of an Arizona 
law allowing suspension and revocation of business licenses fell within 
the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act’s (IRCA) savings 
clause.132  Despite this, however, the Court went on to consider 
whether IRCA impliedly preempted the Arizona provision.133  
Although the Court found that IRCA did not impliedly preempt the 
Arizona provision,134 the mere fact that the Court engaged in the 
implied preemption analysis demonstrates that a state law, despite 
falling under the umbrella of a savings clause, can nevertheless be 
impliedly preempted. 
Additionally, in previous preemption cases, the Supreme Court has 
interpreted savings clauses narrowly to prevent them from destroying 
the meaning of the statute itself.135  For example, in AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion,136 the Court rejected an interpretation of the 
Federal Arbitration Act’s (FAA) savings clause137 that would have 
                                                          
 127. Id. at 865. 
 128. See id. at 868 (quoting the savings clause as stating “[c]ompliance with” 
federal motor vehicle safety standards in this federal statute “does not exempt any 
person from any liability under common law”). 
 129. Id. at 869.  While the statute in Geier contained an express preemption 
provision, the Court held that the provision did not preempt the tort action, rather 
“ordinary preemption principles applied.”  Id. at 867, 869. 
 130. See id. at 869 (holding that a savings clause cannot trump the Supremacy 
Clause when the laws conflict). 
 131. 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011). 
 132. Id. at 1978. 
 133. Id. at 1981–85 (plurality opinion). 
 134. See id. at 1985 (finding that the threshold for preemption was not met here). 
 135. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (stating 
that savings clauses should not be read to allow state laws that would prevent the 
accomplishment of the federal law’s objectives); Davis, supra note 106, at 994 
(providing examples of cases where the Court struggled to read savings clauses in 
ways that would not prevent the preemptive effect of federal regulatory statutes). 
 136. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 137. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (stating that arbitration agreements are “valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for 
the revocation of any contract”). 
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preserved a California judicial rule requiring that class-wide 
arbitration be available in consumer contracts.138  The Court 
explained that the California rule frustrated the FAA’s policy of 
encouraging speedy and efficient dispute resolution139 by requiring a 
form of arbitration lacking these beneficial qualities.140  Therefore, 
the Court rejected the proffered interpretation of the FAA’s savings 
clause and held instead that the California rule was preempted.141  
This shows that despite a federal savings clause, preemption occurs 
when a state law is found to be so inconsistent with the Court’s 
interpretation of a federal law that the federal savings clause 
essentially destroys itself.142 
2. Step two of conflict preemption analysis:  Identifying a conflict 
Once the federal law’s purpose has been identified, the second 
step in an implied conflict preemption analysis is to determine 
whether the federal and state laws conflict.143  The Supreme Court 
has not articulated a strict definition of what constitutes a conflict for 
preemption purposes.144  Instead, the Court has identified two broad 
categories of conflict:  “impossibility” conflicts and “frustration of 
purpose” or “obstacle” conflicts.145  Although the Court sometimes 
refers to these as separate categories of preemption, both are forms 
of conflict preemption.146 
                                                          
 138. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746 (citing Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 
P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005)). 
 139. See id. at 1749 (stating that the FAA reflects a policy in favor of arbitration as 
an “efficient, streamlined,” and informal way to resolve consumer disputes). 
 140. See id. at 1751–52 (asserting that class-wide arbitration displays none of the 
traditional positive attributes of bilateral arbitration, but instead raises the stakes in 
arbitration, is lengthy and complicated, and requires procedural formality in order 
to bind absent members of the class). 
 141. See id. at 1753 (holding that because the California rule stands in the way of 
Congress’s purposes, the rule is preempted by the FAA). 
 142. See id. at 1748 (explaining that the Court should not interpret the act to be 
self-destructive, which would result from the continued existence of absolutely 
inconsistent provisions). 
 143. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (listing expressions the Court 
has used to describe the types of conflict that can require preemption:  “conflicting; 
contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; 
inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and interference”). 
 144. See id. (cautioning against strict adherence to any test for identifying conflicts 
because “none of these expressions provides an infallible constitutional test or an 
exclusive constitutional yardstick”). 
 145. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (explaining conflict preemption as 
encompassing state laws that make compliance with federal law impossible or work 
against its intended function). 
 146. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012) (explaining that 
conflict preemption can occur when compliance with state and federal law is 
impossible and when a state law obstructs federal law). 
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In cases of impossibility preemption, the Court asks if the regulated 
entity could “do under federal law what state law requires of it.”147  If 
compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical 
impossibility, then the state law is preempted.148  For example in 
PLIVA, the Court held that it was impossible for generic drug 
manufacturers to comply simultaneously with a state law duty to 
change a drug label and a federal law duty to maintain the existing 
label.149  As such, the Court held that the federal law preempted the 
state law duty.150 
Frustration of purpose conflicts occur when a state law “stands as 
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress.”151  While no formula has been 
established to determine when tension between state and federal law 
reaches the level of frustration of purpose,152  these conflicts may 
arise when state and federal laws have divergent objectives,153 or when 
the laws share a common goal but the actual effects of the state law 
frustrate the accomplishment of federal objectives.154  For example, in 
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,155 the Court held that a 
Massachusetts law restricting state agencies’ ability to trade with 
Burma was preempted by federal trade restrictions imposed on 
Burma.156  Although both laws had a common purpose, the Court 
                                                          
 147. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2579 (2011). 
 148. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963). 
 149. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2577–78. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 
312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
 152. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000) 
(stating that the act as a whole, as well its purposes and intended effects, should be 
considered in determining whether a conflict exists and that this decision is a matter 
of judgment); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988) (noting that the importance 
of the law to the state is irrelevant for the purposes of determining whether a 
frustration of purpose conflict exists). 
 153. See, e.g., Felder, 487 U.S. at 153 (holding that § 1983 preempted a state notice-
of-claim rule because its purpose and effect was to limit claims against state officers). 
 154. See, e.g., Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494–96 (1987) (stating that 
even though the Clean Water Act and state nuisance law have the same goals, state 
causes of action could undermine the Clean Water Act by interfering with the Act’s 
operation); Perez, 402 U.S. at 641–48 (finding that a state law providing that certain 
debts arising out of vehicle accidents survive a discharge of bankruptcy conflicts with 
federal bankruptcy law even though it was passed without intent to conflict because 
the effect of the state law frustrates the federal law’s purpose to provide a new 
opportunity to debtors). 
 155. 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
 156. See id. at 373–74 (finding that the state law undermined three aspects of the 
federal law:  its delegation to the President of control over economic sanctions 
against Burma, its limitation of sanctions to individuals and new investment, and its 
emphasis on proceeding diplomatically). 
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held that a conflict existed because they used distinct methods to 
achieve that end.157 
Alternatively, when a state law’s objective stands in clear opposition 
to federal law, the state statute is accordingly preempted.  For 
example, in Felder v. Casey158, the Court held that a state law requiring 
plaintiffs to file notice before suing state officials was preempted 
because it stood as an obstacle to the objective of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
which provides a remedy for federal rights violations committed by 
state actors.159  The Court explained that the central objective of § 
1983 is “to provide compensatory relief to those deprived of their 
federal rights by state actors,” while the central purpose of the state 
notice requirement was to minimize governmental liability.160  The 
Court decided that a frustration of purpose conflict existed because 
while the federal law aimed to get claims into courts, the state law 
aimed to prevent claims from reaching courts.161  Therefore, in light 
of the conflict, the Court held that the state law was preempted.162  
The conclusion that can be drawn from this is that a state statute 
should be preempted when its meaning can be construed to expressly 
conflict with the object of federal law, or if it frustrates the purpose of 
federal law. 
Thus, federal law preempts conflicting state laws by operation of 
the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.  In particular, a state law that 
frustrates a federal law’s purpose is necessarily displaced because the 
Constitution makes federal law supreme.  In the following sections of 
this Comment, conflict preemption principles will be applied to 
determine that the TVPA preempts certain applications of state 
prostitution laws. 
II. THE TVPA PREEMPTS APPLICATIONS OF STATE CRIMINAL 
PROSTITUTION LAWS TO MINORS BECAUSE ENFORCING THESE LAWS 
AGAINST MINORS CONFLICTS WITH THE TVPA 
Under conflict preemption doctrine, the TVPA preempts the 
application of state criminal prostitution laws to minors because 
enforcing prostitution laws against minors frustrates the purposes of 
the TVPA.  Express preemption does not apply in this case because 
                                                          
 157. See id. at 379–80 (“The fact of a common end hardly neutralizes conflicting 
means.”). 
 158. 487 U.S. 131 (1988). 
 159. Id. at 138. 
 160. Id. at 141. 
 161. See id. at 153 (stressing that the state law alters the outcome of § 1983 cases 
depending on whether the claim is filed in federal or state court). 
 162. Id. (preventing the creation of inconsistent intrastate application of the law). 
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the TVPA contains no explicit preemption language.163  Since the 
federal government has not “occupied the field” of prostitution law 
enforcement or sex trafficking enforcement, and has in fact 
encouraged states to enact sex trafficking penal laws,164 field 
preemption also does not apply.165  Impossibility preemption 
probably also does not apply because the TVPA does not explicitly 
regulate state law enforcement actors.  Since state law enforcement 
officers are not technically obligated to act under the TVPA, there is 
no question about the impossibility of their compliance with two sets 
of obligations.  Instead, the preemptive effect of the TVPA is implied 
by the conflict between the federal law’s purposes and enforcement 
of state criminal prostitution laws against minors.166 
Conflict preemption doctrine calls for a two-step analysis involving 
first, the interpretation of the federal statute to identify its purpose, 
and second, the determination of whether the state law frustrates the 
purpose of the federal law.167  Applying this analysis to determine that 
the TVPA preempts state prostitution laws, the first step indicates that 
the TVPA has two purposes—one protective and one prosecutorial—
and that the accomplishment of these purposes requires that 
prostituted minors be recognized as victims.168  The second step of 
the analysis reveals that enforcing criminal prostitution laws against 
minors frustrates the TVPA’s two objectives regarding prostituted 
minors by contributing to the misidentification of victims, by 
discouraging victims from cooperating in anti-trafficking law 
enforcement efforts, and by re-traumatizing victims without 
addressing their actual needs.169  Therefore, the existence of this 
conflict implies that the TVPA preempts the application of state 
criminal prostitution laws to minors. 
                                                          
 163. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990) (observing that 
express preemption occurs when the statute’s language explicitly states Congress’s 
intent to preempt state law). 
 164. See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 225(b), 122 Stat. 5044, 5072 (directing the Attorney 
General to draft a model state criminal statute that “furthers a comprehensive 
approach to investigation and prosecution through modernization of State and local 
prostitution and pandering statutes”). 
 165. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (explaining that 
field preemption occurs when Congress creates a pervasive federal scheme indicating 
intent to exclusively occupy the field); Franklin, supra note 13, at 364 (noting that 
there is no federal prostitution statute). 
 166. See supra notes 102–07 and accompanying text (identifying impossibility and 
frustration of purpose as the two general categories of conflicts recognized by the 
Court). 
 167. See supra Part I.C (detailing the two steps of a conflict preemption analysis). 
 168. See infra Part II.A. 
 169. See infra Part II.B. 
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A. The Purposes of the TVPA Are To Protect Victims and Prosecute 
Traffickers 
Because congressional purpose is the “ultimate touchstone in every 
preemption case,”170 the first step of this analysis is to interpret the 
TVPA in order to identify its purpose.  This inquiry reveals that the 
TVPA’s broad purpose to combat trafficking involves two particular 
objectives.  First, the TVPA seeks to protect victims of severe sex 
trafficking, and it defines that category to include anyone under the 
age of eighteen who is induced to engage in a commercial sex act.171  
Second, the TVPA seeks to enhance the government’s ability to 
punish traffickers by engaging victims to assist in investigations and 
prosecutions.172  Finally, although the TVPA may appear to suggest a 
lack of intent to preempt, neither the TVPA’s savings clause nor the 
presumption against preemption limit the TVPA from preempting 
the enforcement of state prostitution laws.173 
1. The TVPA seeks to protect prostituted minors by recognizing them as  
 victims of sex trafficking 
A central purpose of the TVPA is to protect prostituted minors by 
recognizing and treating them as victims rather than criminals.  That 
is why the TVPA categorically defines anyone under the age of 
eighteen who engages in a commercial sex act as a per se victim of a 
severe form of trafficking.174  The legislative history of the TVPA and 
its reauthorizations also reflect the understanding that the definition 
is categorical.175  For example, in the House Committee report on the 
2005 reauthorization of the TVPA, one of the Act’s sponsors stated 
                                                          
 170. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting Retail Clerks Int’l 
Ass’n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 171. 22 U.S.C. § 7102 (8)(A), (13) (2006); see H.R. REP. NO. 109-317, pt. 2, at 23 
(2005) (affirming that any person younger than eighteen-years-old who is induced to 
perform a commercial sex act is considered a victim of severe trafficking under the 
TVPA); infra Part II.A.1 (discussing the TVPA and its purposes). 
 172. Infra Part II.A.2. 
 173. Infra Part II.A.3. 
 174. See 22 U.S.C. § 7102(8)(A), (13) (defining severe forms of sex trafficking); id. 
§ 7105(b)(1)(C)(3)(ii) (defining minors engaged in commercial sex as victims of a 
severe form of trafficking in persons and therefore eligible for certain benefits and 
services); see also SISKIN & WYLER, supra note 16, at 21 (observing the consensus that 
prostitution by minors constitutes a form of severe sex trafficking under the TVPA 
whether the minor acted voluntarily or was forced); cf. Brittle, supra note 6, at 1346 
(asserting that the TVPA implicitly acknowledges that minors cannot consent to 
commercial sex). 
 175. See, e.g., In Our Own Backyard, supra note 1, at 2 (statement of Sen. Richard 
Durbin, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Human Rights & the Law) (confirming 
Congress’s view that “all children who were involved in commercial sex crimes are 
victims and should be treated accordingly”). 
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unequivocally that “under the TVPA any person younger than 
eighteen-years-old ‘induced to perform’ a commercial sex act is 
considered a victim of a ‘severe form of trafficking.’”176  Both houses 
of Congress also held hearings on sex trafficking of minors, and in 
each case, testimony from subcommittee members and witnesses 
reflected an understanding that minors involved in commercial sex 
are victims of sex trafficking per se.177 
While the TVPA does not require minors to show proof of 
compulsion to establish their status as victims of severe sex 
trafficking, the language of the Act does require that a minor victim 
be “induced” to engage in a commercial sex act.178  Therefore, some 
might argue that an individual must meet the element of 
recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, obtaining, or 
maintaining of a person for the purpose of a commercial sex act to 
qualify as a victim of severe trafficking.179  However, this does not 
change the categorical nature of the under-eighteen prong of the 
severe sex trafficking victim definition, since any commercial sex act 
involving a minor will necessarily meet the inducement standard.180  
Under the TVPA, a commercial sex act is defined as the exchange of 
sex for something of value.181  When a person provides a minor with 
something of value in exchange for sex, this exchange is a form of 
“obtaining” sex with a minor.182  That exchange itself satisfies the 
                                                          
 176. H.R. REP. NO. 109-317, pt. 2, at 23; see also Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking 
Hearing, supra note 25, at 2 (statement of Rep. Robert C. Scott, Chairman, H. 
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec.) (emphasizing that child 
prostitutes are some of the most vulnerable victims and that they should be treated as 
such). 
 177. See Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking Hearing, supra note 25, at 2 (statement of 
Rep. Robert C. Scott, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland 
Sec.) (discussing a documentary that depicted sexually exploited children as victims 
and survivors, rather than criminals); id. at 227 (testimony of Suzanna Tiapula, 
National District Attorneys Association) (discussing the inappropriate criminalization 
of juvenile victims); In Our Own Backyard, supra note 1, at 2 (statement of Sen. 
Richard Durbin, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Human Rights & the Law) (charging 
the states with exacerbating the problem of child prostitution by initiating 
prosecution); see also HUMAN SMUGGLING & TRAFFICKING CTR., DOMESTIC HUMAN 
TRAFFICKING:  AN INTERNAL ISSUE 3 (2008), available at http://www.state.gov/ 
documents/organization/113612.pdf (clarifying that if a person under eighteen is 
used to commit a commercial sexual act, nothing more is required to show that the 
person is a victim); NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, COMMERCIAL 
SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN:  WHAT DO WE KNOW AND WHAT DO WE DO ABOUT 
IT? 8 (2007), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ 
nij/215733.pdf (urging that “it is important that victims of child sexual exploitation 
are not mistaken for offenders”). 
 178. 22 U.S.C. § 7102(8)(A). 
 179. Id. § 7102(8)(A), (13). 
 180. See id. § 7102(8)(A) (criminalizing any inducement of a minor to perform a 
commercial sex act). 
 181. Id. § 7102(3). 
 182. See Linda Smith & Samantha Healy Vardaman, A Legislative Framework for 
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element of inducement regardless of whether or not a third party, 
such as a pimp or trafficker, is involved.  Indeed, the DOJ relies on 
this understanding of the TVPA’s criminal provisions to obtain 
convictions of individuals who attempt to purchase sex with a 
minor.183 
In enacting the TVPA, Congress did not merely intend to define 
prostituted minors as victims—it sought to protect them.  Careful 
interpretation of the TVPA indicates that protection means, at a 
minimum, ensuring that victims are not treated as criminals.184  Thus, 
the Act states that victims should not be incarcerated or otherwise 
penalized for committing unlawful acts as a result of being 
trafficked,185 underscoring the idea that for trafficking victims, these 
acts are essentially involuntary.  The TVPA also calls for regulations to 
ensure that victims in federal custody are provided with medical 
assistance and are informed of their rights as crime victims.186  In 
short, it calls on the relevant agencies to treat trafficking victims in a 
manner consistent with their status as victims.187  In addition, the Act 
calls for research on the best practices for identifying and assisting 
victims and declares that these should be disseminated to state and 
local law enforcement,188 indicating Congress’s expectation that all 
levels of government will engage in efforts to protect trafficking 
victims. 
The TVPA’s legislative history also confirms this understanding of 
                                                          
Combating Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking, 23 REGENT U. L. REV. 265, 275 (2011) (noting 
a federal prosecutor in Kansas who pursued purchasers of sex with minors relied on 
the words “obtain” and “entice” to satisfy the elements of a TVPA criminal provision). 
 183. See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Att’y, Undercover Sting Leads to First-
Ever Human Trafficking Charges for Attempting to Pay for Sex with Children (Mar. 
10, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/mow/news2009/ 
childers.ind.htm (describing a sting operation where a “John” was charged under the 
TVPA for attempting to pay a child for sex).  This point suggests that a prostituted 
minor qualifies as a victim of severe sex trafficking whether or not he or she has a 
pimp or trafficker.  Nevertheless, most children involved in commercial sex have 
pimps.  See Sherman & Grace, supra note 25, at 338 (detailing methods pimps use to 
target girls). 
 184. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(19) (describing victims as not culpable for 
crimes committed as result of being trafficked); id. § 7105(c) (directing the Attorney 
General to implement regulations ensuring proper treatment of victims in federal 
custody). 
 185. See id. § 7101(b)(19) (providing the use of false documentation and illegal 
entrance into the country as examples of crimes that might be committed solely as a 
result of being trafficked). 
 186. See id. § 7105(c) (directing that regulations should require that victims be 
treated as crime victims and protected from intimidation and threats of reprisal); 28 
C.F.R. § 1100.29 (2011) (setting forth DOJ regulations pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 
7105(c)). 
 187. 22 U.S.C. § 7105(c). 
 188. See 42 U.S.C. § 14044(a) (calling for research and statistical review to be 
delivered at a trafficking conference). 
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“protection.”  For example, a House Judiciary Committee report 
states that, “as a result of the TVPA . . . victims of severe forms of 
trafficking in the United States are legally required to be treated as 
victims, rather than as criminals.”189  Another member of Congress 
also characterized the TVPA as a national statement that “trafficking 
victims must not be dismissed by the law enforcement community as 
prostitutes or juvenile delinquents.”190  In summary, the plain 
language and legislative history of the TVPA and its subsequent 
reauthorizations shows that a central purpose of the Act is to protect 
prostituted minors by ensuring that they are recognized and treated 
as victims of severe sex trafficking instead of criminals. 
2. The TVPA seeks to prosecute traffickers and relies on victims’ assistance to 
 accomplish that goal 
The TVPA’s second central objective is to enhance the 
government’s ability to investigate and punish traffickers.191  This goal 
is not entirely independent of the objective to protect victims.  In 
fact, Congress addressed protection and prosecution jointly in the 
TVPA in recognition of the critical role that victims play in the 
investigation and prosecution of traffickers.192  Evidence of this 
recognition is found in the provisions of the TVPA itself.  Not only 
did the TVPA criminalize the sex trafficking of minors193 and other 
trafficking-related conduct,194 it also gave federal law enforcement 
agencies authority to provide certain protections to victims who 
cooperate in trafficking prosecutions.195  For example, the TVPA 
includes immigration remedies that are available to non-citizen 
victims who cooperate with law enforcement.196  These provisions 
show that a central goal of the TVPA is investigation. 
In practice, moreover, law enforcement officers echo the 
                                                          
 189. H.R. REP. NO. 109-317, pt. 2, at 22 (2005) (emphasis added). 
 190. 151 CONG. REC. 4174 (2005) (statement of Rep. Christopher Smith). 
 191. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing the TVPA’s objective to 
prosecute sex traffickers). 
 192. See 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(20) (recognizing that, without protection or 
provision of services to counter the harmful physical and psychological effects of 
trafficking, victims are unable or unwilling to assist in the investigation or 
prosecution of their traffickers). 
 193. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (prohibiting sex trafficking of a minor and sex 
trafficking through means of force, fraud, or coercion). 
 194. See, e.g., id. § 1592 (criminalizing the confiscation of identity documents as 
part of trafficking activity). 
 195. E.g., 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(15)(T)(i)(III)(aa) (requiring T visa applicants to show 
they have complied with any reasonable law enforcement requests). 
 196. Victims who are under the age of eighteen are not required to cooperate 
with law enforcement to receive immigration relief.  Id. § 101(a)(15)(T)(i)(III)(cc).  
This distinction between adult and minor victims is yet another indication of 
Congress’s particular concern for prostituted minors. 
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observation that a successful prosecution of trafficking crimes 
depends on the ability to identify and gain the cooperation of 
victims.197  For example, a survey funded by the DOJ found that 
federal prosecutors believe a cooperating victim witness is the single 
most important factor in successfully prosecuting a TVPA case.198  
Thus, while prosecuting traffickers is itself a central objective of the 
TVPA, the achievement of that objective is closely tied to the goal of 
victim protection. 
3. The savings clause and the presumption against preemption do not 
 materially limit the interpretation of the TVPA’s purposes with regard to 
 prostituted minors 
The TVPA’s savings clause and the so-called “presumption against 
preemption” are two additional factors that could affect whether the 
TVPA is interpreted as preempting the application of state 
prostitution laws to minors.  However, while both may appear to 
suggest the absence of congressional intent to preempt, neither one 
materially limits the TVPA’s goals regarding prostituted minors.  
First, the so-called “presumption against preemption” does not apply 
in these circumstances.  Scholars and members of the Supreme Court 
have called into question the constitutional justification for applying 
a presumption against preemption in cases involving conflict 
preemption, the form of preemption thought to exist here.199  
                                                          
 197. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 
ON U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES TO COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS FISCAL YEAR 2005, 
at 5 (2006) (asserting that the success of the federal government’s anti-trafficking 
efforts “hinges” on the victim-centric approach). 
 198. See HEATHER CLAWSON ET AL., ICF INT’L, PROSECUTING HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
CASES:  LESSONS LEARNED AND PROMISING PRACTICES 19–20 (2008), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/223972.pdf (reporting findings from 
interviews with federal prosecutors in jurisdictions with the greatest percentages of 
trafficking cases). 
 199. See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2579–80 (2011) (plurality 
opinion) (asserting that courts should not attempt to reconcile federal law with 
seemingly conflicting state law because the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause 
mandates the displacement of state law when a conflict exists); Dinh, supra note 105, 
at 2087, 2092 (arguing that the Constitution and the structure of American 
federalism do not permit the wholesale application of a presumption against 
preemption). 
Elsewhere, Justice Thomas, the author of the PLIVA plurality opinion, has 
expressed the view that frustration of purpose preemption is unwarranted under the 
Supremacy Clause and that only impossibility conflicts are valid.  See Williamson v. 
Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131, 1142 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (characterizing “purposes-and-objectives” preemption as based on 
“judicial suppositions”).  Although this Comment uses the language of “frustration of 
purpose” rather than “impossibility” to describe the conflict between the TVPA and 
applications of state criminal prostitution laws to minors, the plurality opinion’s 
argument in PLIVA is still relevant.  First, the Court has noted that the lines between 
the various types of conflicts are fluid.  See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) 
CRILE.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 8/27/2012  12:21 PM 
2012] A MINOR CONFLICT 1813 
Nevertheless, even if the presumption is applicable in implied 
conflict preemption cases, it can be overcome in this case because of 
the text, the legislative history, and the fact that states have not 
traditionally occupied the relevant area of law—trafficking. 
The strength of the presumption against preemption increases 
when the area in which the federal law operates is one traditionally 
reserved to the states.200  As such, determining the significance of the 
presumption in any case depends on properly identifying the relevant 
area of law.201  With the TVPA, one might argue that the question at 
issue is whether the presumption applies when the federal 
government attempts to regulate prostitution.  Upon this framing of 
the issue, the TVPA would seem a classic case for the presumption, 
since criminal enforcement of prostitution laws is precisely the type 
of historic police power reserved to the states that the presumption 
against preemption is supposed to protect.202  This Comment, 
however, does not argue that the TVPA preempts prostitution laws 
per se, but rather, that states’ applications of prostitution laws 
interfere with the regulation of sex trafficking of minors.  Thus, the 
more accurate way to frame the question at issue is whether the 
presumption applies when the federal government attempts to 
regulate sex trafficking of minors. 
Identifying sex trafficking of minors as the relevant area of law 
reveals the inappropriateness of applying the presumption against 
                                                          
(observing that the diversity of expressions used by the Supreme Court in conflict 
preemption cases results in the lack of a clear constitutional standard).  Second, 
Justice Thomas’s view of frustration of purpose preemption has never been accepted 
by a majority of the Court, and that form of preemption was not asserted in PLIVA.  
Third, Justice Thomas’s specific objections to frustration of purpose conflicts may 
not apply to this case, since the criticism is primarily a rejection of the use of atextual 
sources to determine congressional intent.  See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 594 
(2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (criticizing the use of “legislative 
history, broad atextual notions of congressional purpose, and even congressional 
inaction in order to pre-empt state law”). For example, in Crosbv National Foreign 
Trade Council, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas refused to join a majority opinion 
because of its reliance on legislative history  even though they reached the same 
conclusion that the federal act preempted the state law at issue.  530 U.S. at 388–91 
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).  Since the argument in this Comment relies 
at least as much on statutory text as on legislative history, this criticism may not apply. 
 200. See, e.g., Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565 (describing the presumption against 
preemption as applying particularly where a federal law regulates an area 
traditionally occupied by the states); Gasaway, supra note 110, at 35 (noting the 
applicability of the presumption against preemption depends on whether states have 
traditional authority in the relevant area of law). 
 201. See Gasaway, supra note 110, at 35 (explaining how the framing of the 
traditional authority issue can alter conclusions about the applicability of the 
presumption against preemption). 
 202. See United States v. Wolf, 787 F.2d 1094, 1097 (7th Cir. 1986) (recognizing 
that the states, not the federal government, have primary responsibility for policing 
sexual misconduct). 
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preemption to the TVPA because states do not have traditional 
authority over sex trafficking of minors.203  Instead, the federal 
government has an established role in regulating commercial sex 
trafficking and the sexual exploitation of minors.204  For example, the 
Mann Act,205 enacted in 1910, prohibits the interstate transport of 
individuals for the purpose of prostitution or illegal sexual acts.206  
Prior to the TVPA, the Mann Act was the federal government’s 
primary prosecutorial tool for fighting sex trafficking.207  In addition, 
there are numerous federal laws regulating the sexual abuse and 
exploitation of minors.208  For example, the Child Abuse Prevention 
and Treatment Act of 1974209 lists sexual exploitation among the 
categories of abuse that must be reported by teachers, doctors, and 
child services providers.210  Also, the PROTECT Act211 prohibits U.S. 
citizens abroad from engaging in illicit sexual activity with minors,212 
and various other federal laws prohibit aspects of child 
                                                          
 203. See Moira Heiges, Note, From the Inside Out:  Reforming State and Local 
Prostitution Enforcement to Combat Sex Trafficking in the United States and Abroad, 94 
MINN. L. REV. 428, 455–56 (2009) (arguing that federal involvement in state 
prostitution enforcement is “historically appropriate” due to its regulation of sex 
trafficking). 
 204. See Birckhead, supra note 28, at 1074–75 (noting pre-TVPA federal laws 
prohibiting child pornography and sexual abuse proved insufficient to combat the 
prostitution of minors); Franklin, supra note 13, at 365 (discussing federal laws that 
regulate interstate pimping and prostitution). 
 205. White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421–24 (2006)). 
 206. 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2006).  Unlike the TVPA, the Mann Act does not provide 
for protection of victims of sex trafficking.  See Schwartz, supra note 31, at 243 (noting 
that the Mann Act’s focus is on traffickers, pimps, and madams, and not those 
individuals actually engaging in commercial sex). 
 207. See ADAMS ET AL., supra note 9, at 3 (commenting that the Mann Act was 
enacted with the purpose of fighting forced prostitution); Schwartz, supra note 31, at 
242–43 (noting that the Mann Act deals directly with the trafficker, not those 
trafficked). 
 208. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (prohibiting the interstate transport of a minor 
to engage in sexually explicit conduct); id. § 2251A (criminalizing the sale of transfer 
of a minor for the purpose of obtaining a visual depiction of the minor engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct); see also KEVONNE SMALL ET AL., URBAN INST., AN ANALYSIS OF 
FEDERALLY PROSECUTED COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN (CSEC) 
CASES SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING AND VIOLENCE PROTECTION 
ACT OF 2000, at 18 (2008) (listing the three categories of federal CSEC offenses as 
sexual exploitation of children, child pornography, and child prostitution). 
 209. Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 5 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
5101−5107, 5116–5116i (2006)). 
 210. 42 U.S.C. § 13031(a)–(b). 
 211. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children 
Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C. (2006 & Supp. II 2009)). 
 212. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c).  Illicit sexual conduct is defined in part as “any 
commercial sex act (as defined in section 1591) with a person under [eighteen] 
years of age.”  Id. § 2423(f). 
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pornography.213  Therefore, the presumption does not have 
significant force in the area of sex trafficking of minors because 
federal law has occupied this area, as demonstrated by the large 
extent of federal legislation relating to sexual exploitation of minors. 
In addition, the TVPA’s savings clause is not dispositive of the 
preemption question because Geier,214 Whiting,215 and Concepcion216 all 
indicate that ordinary principles of conflict preemption apply even 
when a federal statute contains a savings clause.  In this case, 
although the language of the TVPA’s savings clause indicates that the 
Act does not preempt state prostitution laws generally,217 ordinary 
principles of conflict preemption indicate that certain applications of 
state prostitution laws conflict with the TVPA, and therefore are 
preempted.  As demonstrated below, the conflict exists because the 
accomplishment of the TVPA’s protective and prosecutorial purposes 
require prostituted minors to be recognized and treated as victims.218  
States’ enforcement of criminal prostitution laws against minors 
ultimately frustrates the TVPA’s purposes by treating prostituted 
minors as criminals and by making it harder to identify victims and 
prosecute traffickers.219  Thus, although the TVPA’s savings clause 
may be interpreted to preserve state prostitution laws generally, it 
cannot preserve states’ enforcement of those laws against minors. 
This interpretation is consistent with Supreme Court precedent 
because it gives effect to the savings clause without destroying the 
meaning and purpose of the TVPA itself.220  In previous implied 
                                                          
 213. See, e.g., id. § 2251 (prohibiting the use, enticement, employment, coercion, 
or inducement of any minor to engage in any sexually explicit conduct for the 
purpose of producing any visual depiction of that conduct); id. §§ 2252–2252A 
(prohibiting knowingly transporting, shipping, receiving, distributing, or possessing 
any visual depiction involving a minor in sexually explicit conduct). 
 214. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000) (finding conflict 
preemption despite the existence of a savings clause in the federal statute at issue). 
 215. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1981–85 (2011) (plurality 
opinion) (conducting an implied conflict analysis despite having already decided 
that the state law in question was covered by the federal statute’s savings clause). 
 216. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (holding 
that it would be irrational for a federal statute’s savings clause to be construed as 
allowing a state law totally inconsistent with the act). 
 217. See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 225(a)(2), 122 Stat. 5044, 5072 (stating that nothing in 
the TVPA and its reauthorization shall be interpreted to “preempt, supplant, or limit 
the effect of any [s]tate or [f]ederal criminal law”). 
 218. See infra Part II.B (explaining that treating prostituted minors as offenders 
instead of victims does not address their specialized needs and discourages their 
cooperation with law enforcement to help prosecute their traffickers). 
 219. See SHARED HOPE REPORT FROM THE U.S. MID-TERM REVIEW, supra note 36, at 
15–16 (finding that sex trafficked minors are frequently misidentified because of 
confusion stemming from the criminal law). 
 220. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747–48 (suggesting savings clauses should be 
interpreted consistently with the whole act). 
CRILE.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 8/27/2012  12:21 PM 
1816 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1783 
preemption cases, the Supreme Court has avoided interpreting 
savings clauses in ways that would destroy the meaning of a federal 
statute or frustrate its purpose.221  For example, in Concepcion, the 
Court rejected the proposition that a savings clause in the FAA 
preserved a state judicial rule that contradicted the FAA’s core 
policies.222  “[T]he act cannot be held to destroy itself,” the Court 
explained.223  Here, construing the TVPA’s savings clause to preserve 
states’ enforcement of criminal prostitution laws against minors 
would deny the categorical nature of the TVPA’s definition of a 
minor victim of severe sex trafficking224 and frustrate its protective 
and prosecutorial purposes.225  As such, Concepcion indicates that the 
clause should be read as not preserving those applications. 
Interpreting the savings clause so that it does not protect states’ 
enforcement of criminal prostitution laws against minors is likely in 
accordance with Congress’s intent regarding the TVPA’s savings 
clause.226  Congress located the savings clause in a section of the 2008 
TVPA reauthorization entitled “Promoting Effective State 
Enforcement.”227  The location of the savings clause suggests that it 
should be read in light of Congress’s broader effort to engage states 
in the anti-trafficking project.228  In addition to the savings clause, this 
                                                          
 221. See, e.g., id. at 1750–51 (rejecting an interpretation of the savings clause in the 
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) that would save a state rule, because this rule would 
destroy the FAA’s purpose of promoting arbitration); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 
529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000) (deciding that a savings clause in the National Traffic and 
Motor Vehicle Safety Act removed some tort actions from preemption, but not those 
that conflicted with federal regulations enacted pursuant to the Act). 
 222. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751–53 (asserting that the state judicial rule 
would have destroyed the purpose of the FAA by imposing a form of arbitration 
stripped of its traditional beneficial characteristics). 
 223. Id. at 1748 (quoting AT&T Co. v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 228 
(1998)). 
 224. 22 U.S.C. § 7102(13) (2006); see also supra notes 174–77 and accompanying 
text (explaining that all individuals under age eighteen who are involved in 
commercial sex constitute “victims of severe sex trafficking” under the TVPA 
definition). 
 225. See supra Part II.B (describing the conflict between state laws and the 
purposes of the TVPA). 
 226. See supra Part II.A.1 (arguing that Congress’s central purpose in passing the 
TVPA was to protect prostituted minors); see also Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 
70, 76 (2008) (noting that congressional intent is “the ultimate touchstone” of 
implied conflict preemption analysis (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 
485 (1996))). 
 227. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 225, 122 Stat. 5044, 5072. 
 228. See 42 U.S.C. § 14044(a)(2) (directing the Attorney General to hold a 
conference with state and local law enforcement to discuss best practices for 
identifying trafficking victims, investigating and prosecuting traffickers, and working 
with service providers to optimize assistance to victims); see also ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 
2010 REPORT, supra note 85, at 72–82 (describing training activities and joint state-
federal law enforcement operations). 
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section also contains a provision directing the Attorney General to 
draft a model state criminal statute that “furthers a comprehensive 
approach to investigation and prosecution through modernization of 
State and local prostitution and pandering statutes.”229  The 
explanatory statement note from the House of Representatives states 
that issuing a model statute is necessary because many state statutes in 
the area of prostitution enforcement are “antiquated.”230  Therefore, 
the savings clause in this context suggests that the likely purpose of 
the savings clause is to preserve state prostitution laws that further, 
but do not conflict with, the federal anti-trafficking agenda.231 
Therefore, despite the savings clause and the presumption against 
preemption, the first step of the conflict preemption analysis makes 
clear that the TVPA has two objectives regarding prostituted minors:  
it seeks to protect prostituted minors, whom it defines as victims of 
severe sex trafficking, and it seeks to punish traffickers by engaging 
victims’ assistance in investigations and prosecutions.  Neither the 
savings clause nor the presumption against preemption prevents the 
TVPA from preempting the application of state prostitution laws to 
minors.  Supreme Court jurisprudence in implied conflict 
preemption does not allow a savings clause to save a state law that 
would defeat the purpose of the federal law.232  Supreme Court 
jurisprudence also leads to the conclusion that the presumption 
should only apply when Congress legislates in an area of law 
traditionally within the states’ police powers.233 
B. The Enforcement of State Criminal Prostitution Laws Against Minors 
Frustrates the Purposes of the TVPA 
The second step of the conflict preemption analysis, determining 
whether a conflict exists, illustrates that regardless of states’ rationales 
                                                          
 229. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act § 
225(b).  The latest Senate reauthorization bill includes a provision that would 
explicitly instruct the Attorney General to draft a model statute with protections for 
persons under eighteen-years-old who have been arrested for engaging in 
commercial sex acts.  S. 1301, 112th Cong. § 233 (2011). 
 230. 154 CONG. REC. 24,602–03 (2008). 
 231. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) 
(suggesting that a proper interpretation of a savings clause makes it consistent with 
the whole act); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 386–88 (2000) 
(finding the absence of explicit language in the federal act as an insufficient 
indicator of any congressional intent to preempt state laws that frustrate the act’s 
purposes). 
 232. See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing how applying state prostitution laws to minors 
conflicts with the TVPA’s goals of treating prostituted minors as victims and 
obtaining their cooperation in prosecuting their traffickers). 
 233. See supra Part II.A.3 (illustrating the extensiveness of the federal 
government’s legislative activity in the area of sex trafficking). 
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for enforcing criminal prostitution laws against minors, doing so 
conflicts with the TVPA in two ways.  First, states’ enforcement of 
criminal prostitution laws against minors frustrates the achievement 
of the TVPA’s protective goal because treating prostituted minors as 
offenders re-traumatizes them and fails to address their actual 
needs.234  Second, states’ enforcement of criminal prostitution laws 
against minors frustrates the TVPA’s prosecutorial goal by 
discouraging victim witnesses from cooperating with law enforcement 
and by contributing to misidentification of victims.235 
1. Enforcing criminal prostitution laws against minors frustrates the 
 TVPA’s protective purpose 
States’ enforcement of criminal prostitution laws against minors 
conflicts with the TVPA by frustrating its goal to protect victims of 
severe sex trafficking.  The TVPA clearly and categorically defines 
prostituted minors as victims and aims to protect them rather than 
criminalize them.236  When states apply criminal prostitution laws to 
minors, however, they instead treat those minors as criminals and 
juvenile delinquents.237  Thus, the enforcement of criminal 
prostitution laws against minors conflicts with the TVPA by penalizing 
the very individuals whom Congress has declared are deserving of 
protection rather than punishment.238 
This conflict is similar to the one presented in Felder.239  There, the 
Supreme Court held that the state law notice requirement, the 
                                                          
 234. See infra Part II.B.1 (explaining how the TVPA’s protective goal includes 
providing victims with specialized services, most of which are generally unavailable to 
victims charged with prostitution offenses). 
 235. See infra Part II.B.2 (elaborating on how the TVPA’s prosecutorial goal is 
greatly hindered by charging prostituted minors as offenders because this only turns 
the minors further against the law enforcement system). 
 236. The TVPA uses a rehabilitative approach to protect prostituted minors and 
focuses on providing understanding and specialized services, such as psychological 
counseling.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 14044b (2006) (establishing a pilot program for 
residential treatment facilities for minor victims); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE 
NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CHILD EXPLOITATION PREVENTION AND INTERDICTION:  A 
REPORT TO CONGRESS 35 (2010), [hereinafter DOJ NATIONAL STRATEGY] available at 
http://www.justice.gov/psc/docs/natstrategyreport.pdf (noting that the abuse 
prostituted minors experience results in their need for specialized recovery 
programs); see also SENIOR POLICY OPERATING, supra note 92, at 7A (listing services 
available to victims of severe sex trafficking). 
 237. See People v. Samantha R., No. 2011KN092555, 2011 WL 6303402, at *2, *4 
(N.Y. Crim. Ct. Dec. 16, 2011) (reasoning that dismissal of a sixteen-year-old’s 
prostitution charge was justified because criminal prosecution of such defendants is 
inconsistent with the ameliorative aims of state and federal laws aiming to protect 
prostituted minors). 
 238. See KENNEDY & PUCCI, supra note 30, at 20 (“The fact that hundreds of 
children are being processed through the juvenile justice system as delinquents 
simply does not recognize their victim status.”). 
 239. 487 U.S. 131 (1988). 
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purpose of which was to limit suits against government officials, was 
in conflict with the compensatory goals of § 1983, the purpose of 
which was to provide a remedy for plaintiffs with claims against 
government officials.240  The dichotomous aims of the state and 
federal laws concerning prostituted minors present a similar conflict.  
One law seeks to protect prostituted minors as victims, while the 
other law treats them as criminals and delinquents. 
Proponents of criminal prostitution laws as applied to minors 
argue that the criminalization is in place to protect minors,241 and 
therefore, the purposes of the state and federal laws do not conflict.  
For example, supporters of states’ enforcement of criminal 
prostitution laws against minors have argued that prosecution and 
detention of prostituted minors can be beneficial because prostituted 
minors can thereby be temporarily removed from the street and the 
control of their pimps or traffickers, and can be linked with service 
providers.242 
In response, even assuming that states apply criminal prostitution 
laws to minors for protective purposes—the fact that the TVPA 
shares the same goal, to protect prostituted minors, would not 
eliminate the conflict.243  As illustrated in cases like Crosby v. National 
Foreign Trade Council, a federal law can preempt a state law that shares 
its purpose if the state’s methods interfere with federal efforts 
enough to frustrate them.244  In the case of prostituted minors, even if 
states aim to protect prostituted minors, their use of criminal and 
delinquency adjudication to achieve that goal interferes with the 
TVPA’s effort to protect prostituted minors by not treating them as 
offenders.245 
                                                          
 240. Id. at 138. 
 241. See supra notes 34–35, 37 and accompanying text (discussing states’ non-
punitive rationales for enforcing criminal prostitution laws against minors). 
 242. See, e.g., Annitto, supra note 33, at 26–27 (relaying arguments made by some 
state legislators and prosecutors that prosecution is a necessary tool to convince 
prostituted minors to stop engaging in destructive behavior). 
 243. See supra notes 153–57 and accompanying text (discussing how laws with the 
same goals can still conflict); see also, e.g., Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 
500 (1987) (holding that even though a state nuisance claim and federal regulation 
had the same goal of controlling water pollution, the state tort claim was preempted 
because it interfered with the methods that the federal law designed to reach that 
goal). 
 244. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373–74 (2000) 
(finding that a state law limiting trade with Burma was preempted by federal trade 
limits). 
 245. See SMITH ET AL., supra note 2, at vi (noting that prostituted minors who are 
detained cannot access services they critically require); Birckhead, supra note 28, at 
1085 (claiming that the argument that prosecution and detention are somehow 
helpful for prostituted minors ignores the many collateral consequences that result 
from being processed in the criminal justice system). 
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The federal law’s approach reflects what is known about the 
harmful consequences of prosecuting prostituted minors.  
Adjudication is often stigmatizing and marginalizing.246  It often re-
traumatizes victims,247 increasing their sense of powerlessness and 
making the process of recovery more difficult.248  Moreover, as a 
result of being criminally charged, a prostituted minor may be left 
with a criminal record, and even juvenile adjudications can be used 
to enhance sentences in future adjudications.249  In addition, 
prosecution may disqualify them from eligibility for crime victim 
funds in some states, and they may face other undesirable 
consequences, such as expulsion from school.250  These facts 
demonstrate that the actual effects of adjudication are harmful to 
prostituted minors, and as such, enforcing criminal prostitution laws 
against minors conflicts with the TVPA’s protective purpose 
regardless of states’ rationales. 
2. Enforcing criminal prostitution laws against minors frustrates the 
 TVPA’s prosecutorial purpose 
States’ enforcement of criminal prostitution laws against minors 
also conflicts with the TVPA’s goal of prosecuting traffickers by 
interfering with victim identification251 and discouraging victims from 
                                                          
 246. See Oversight:  Combating Sex Trafficking in NYC:  Examining Law Enforcement 
Efforts—Prevention and Prosecution:  Hearing Before the Comm. on Women’s Issues & the 
Comm. on Pub. Safety, 2011 Leg., 2009–2013 Sess. 1–2, 5 (N.Y. City Council 2011) 
(statement of Kate Mogulescu, Legal Aid Society Attorney) (noting that even after 
victims manage to escape trafficking, their criminal records preclude them from 
obtaining necessities, such as housing and employment); see also In Our Own Backyard, 
supra note 1, at 18 (statement of Shaquana, youth outreach worker and trafficking 
survivor) (describing her experience being jailed in juvenile detention and being 
made to feel ashamed and embarrassed); DOJ NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 236, at 
35 (noting that the stigma of being placed in criminal facilities can cause prostituted 
minors to return to their pimps and traffickers). 
 247. See SMITH ET AL., supra note 2, at 50–51 (stating that arrest re-traumatizes 
prostituted minors and providing an example of a prostituted minor’s experience 
with arrest and prosecution); see also Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking Hearing, supra note 
25, at 2 (statement of Rep. Robert C. Scott, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Crime, 
Terrorism, & Homeland Sec.) (noting that the particular importance of treating 
prostituted minors as victims and not criminals is due to the fact that they are the 
most vulnerable victims and are “in need of understanding and specialized 
treatment”). 
 248. See Birckhead, supra note 28, at 1086 (citing research finding that labeling 
prostituted minors as offenders increases their experience of trauma). 
 249. See id. at 1085 & n.158 (characterizing arguments in favor of prosecution of 
prostituted minors as unpersuasive because of collateral consequences). 
 250. See Sherman & Grace, supra note 25, at 344 (reporting that minor victims of 
sexual exploitation who are treated as offenders and prosecuted for certain sex acts 
may even have to register on state sex offender lists). 
 251. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-317, pt. 2, at 18–19 (2005) (suggesting that the lack of 
reliable data highlights the need for law enforcement to participate in gathering 
information); Sherman & Grace, supra note 25, at 331 (explaining that reporting a 
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cooperating with law enforcement.252  Misidentification frustrates 
both the prosecutorial and the protection goals.253  State laws that 
criminalize prostituted minors impede identification efforts by 
providing state law enforcement with conflicting guidance on 
whether minors should be considered victims or criminals.254  As a 
result, prostituted minors go unidentified, and opportunities to 
investigate traffickers are potentially lost.255 
In addition, enforcing criminal prostitution laws against minors 
makes them less likely to cooperate usefully with law enforcement 
officers investigating and seeking convictions of criminal 
traffickers.256  This is particularly problematic because successful 
                                                          
prostituted minor as an offender rather than a victim triggers an entirely different set 
of system responses). 
 252. See Annitto, supra note 33, at 42–43 (asserting that a victim-centered 
approach is a good law enforcement strategy because criminalizing prostituted 
minors makes them hostile to law enforcement agents and reduces chances of 
cooperation); see also Lamb, supra note 30, at 84–85 (suggesting that courts’ punitive 
philosophies toward prostituted minors makes victims more likely to refuse to testify 
out of fear that they will be prosecuted or that they will not be protected from the 
retribution of their pimps). 
 253. See Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking Hearing, supra note 25, at 116 (statement of 
former Rep. Linda Smith) (describing misidentification as the primary barrier to 
implementing an effective response to domestic minor sex trafficking).  The fact that 
some prostituted minors are processed by state law enforcement as offenders rather 
than victims also interferes in the collection of national statistics on trafficking 
incidents.  See 2011 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 69, at 373 
(commenting on FBI and Department of Defense efforts to address the lack of 
uniform nationwide reporting protocols for sex trafficking). 
 254. See Heiges, supra note 203, at 450–51 (labeling the conflicting federal and 
state laws “schizophrenic” and reasoning that, when faced with a choice between 
criminal or victim classification of a prostituted minor, state law enforcement agents 
are more likely to choose criminal classification because it is a more familiar route); 
Sangalis, supra note 76, at 416 (noting that part of the identification problem stems 
from law enforcement’s confusion as to the definition of a trafficking victim); see also 
VT. ATT’Y GEN., REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL PURSUANT TO S. 272, AN ACT 
RELATING TO HUMAN TRAFFICKING, IN THE 2009–2010 GENERAL ASSEMBLY 8 (2011), 
available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/reports/2011ExternalReports/263725.pdf 
(relaying that a state trafficking task force heard testimony that local law 
enforcement was failing to identify victims of trafficking due to lack of training and 
confusion). 
 255. See SHARED HOPE REPORT FROM THE U.S. MID-TERM REVIEW, supra note 36, at 
15–16 (describing the need to educate state judges and law enforcement about why 
prostituted minors are victims); TEX. JUVENILE PROB. COMM’N, ALTERNATIVES TO 
JUVENILE JUSTICE FOR YOUTH INVOLVED IN PROSTITUTION:  REPORT TO THE 82ND 
LEGISLATURE 3 (2011), available at http://www.tjjd.texas.gov/ 
publications/reports/rptoth201103.pdf (advancing the lack of training and the 
continued criminalization as factors that prevent local law enforcement from 
identifying minors as victims of sex trafficking). 
 256. See INT’L ASSOC. OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, THE CRIME OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING:  A 
LAW ENFORCEMENT GUIDE TO IDENTIFICATION AND INVESTIGATION 8 (2006), available at 
http://www.theiacp.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=W7b9hV6wn%2bA%3d&tabid=37
2 (quoting a trafficking victim as expressing her lack of trust for police); NAT’L CTR. 
FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND 
PROSTITUTION:  BACKGROUND AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 61–62 (1987) (commenting on 
evidence showing that under a prohibition regime, prostitutes are reluctant to seek 
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trafficking investigations and prosecutions rely substantially on 
victims’ cooperation.257  Advocates of enforcing criminal prostitution 
laws against minors sometimes argue the contrary, stating that 
detention and the threat of criminal prosecution are useful tools for 
convincing prostituted minors to cooperate in investigations and 
prosecutions of traffickers.258  This argument, however, conflicts with 
the TVPA’s protective goal,259 and nothing in the TVPA suggests that 
the protection goal should be sacrificed for the sake of the 
prosecution goal. 
Moreover, the argument that enforcing criminal prostitution laws 
against minors helps effectuate the TVPA’s goal of prosecuting 
traffickers ignores sex traffickers’ tactics and the traumatic 
psychological and emotional effect that those tactics have on 
minors.260  Traffickers and pimps are known to target vulnerable 
young people who they exploit and control in large part through the 
formation of complex emotional and psychological relationships.261  
                                                          
police protection against pimps); LINDA A. SMITH ET AL., SHARED HOPE INT’L, 
DOMESTIC MINOR SEX TRAFFICKING:  CHILD SEX SLAVERY IN ARIZONA 34 (2010), available 
at http://www.sharedhope.org/Portals/0/Documents/ArizonaRA.pdf (opining that 
state prosecutors struggle to obtain victim-witness testimony because minors who 
have contact with the criminal justice system are skeptical of law enforcement). 
 257. See In Our Own Backyard, supra note 1, at 10 (statement of Beth Phillips, 
United States Attorney, Western District of Missouri) (describing the time and effort 
needed for law enforcement to gain the trust of victims, whose testimony is often 
necessary to ensure successful prosecutions); DOJ NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 
236, at 34 (stating that obtaining a conviction against a pimp is much more difficult 
without a cooperating victim witness). 
 258. See supra notes 34–35, 37 and accompanying text (discussing the argument 
that, without threat of prosecution, victims will not be willing to give much-needed 
testimony against their pimps). 
 259. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing how the many adverse repercussions of being 
detained or criminally prosecuted do not further the TVPA’s protective goals).  It is 
of course true that prosecuting traffickers helps to protect victims.  However, my 
argument is that whatever benefit victims gain from the prosecution of traffickers 
does not justify subjecting them to criminal prosecution.  Prosecution of traffickers 
should be pursued without relying on coercive prosecution of prostituted minors. 
 260. See United States v. Carreto, 583 F.3d 152, 154–55 (2d Cir. 2009) (illustrating 
how three defendants who pled guilty to sex trafficking had used a combination of 
violence, rape, threats, and feigned affection to control their victims); United States 
v. Jimenez-Calderon, 183 F. App’x 274, 276–77 (3d Cir. 2006) (describing how 
defendant traffickers lured young women with false promises of love, and used a 
combination of affection, threats and physical violence to force them to engage in 
prostitution); United States v. Pipkins, 378 F.3d 1281, 1285–86 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(detailing elaborate rules enforced by pimps in Atlanta), vacated, 544 U.S. 902 
(2005).  See generally RACHEL LLOYD, GIRLS LIKE US (2011) (providing stories about 
prostituted girls’ experiences in “the life” and the difficulties and lack of 
understanding they encounter in the “straight” world). 
 261. See DOJ NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 236, at 31 (contending that children 
who become involved in prostitution are often runaways or “throwaways” who are 
targeted by pimps and traffickers because they lack self-esteem and outside support 
systems); SMITH ET AL., supra note 2, at 37–40 (describing traffickers’ recruitment 
tactics as a form of brainwashing). 
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Their tactics have been described as similar to those used by 
perpetrators of domestic violence, in that both involve the use of 
“interlocking systems of reward and punishment”262 to develop 
dependence and ensure submission and obedience.263  As a result of 
these tactics, minor victims are often initially unable or unwilling to 
assist with law enforcement efforts to prosecute their traffickers.264  
Thus, the evidence about the effect of trafficking on prostituted 
minors suggests that enforcing criminal prostitution laws against 
minors is not effective as a tool for enhancing the success of 
trafficking prosecutions.  Instead, the TVPA represents the more 
effective approach, which is to gain victims’ cooperation by 
recognizing their complex needs and ensuring that they have access 
to the appropriate services.265 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment has argued that the TVPA preempts the 
enforcement of state criminal prostitution laws against minors 
because such enforcement conflicts with the TVPA’s prosecutorial 
and protective purposes.  As demonstrated above, the TVPA’s 
protective and prosecutorial purposes each require prostituted 
minors to be recognized as victims rather than to be treated as 
criminals.  Although states may offer various rationales for enforcing 
criminal prostitution laws against minors, enforcement of such laws 
conflicts with the TVPA’s purposes.  Criminalizing prostituted minors 
frustrates the achievement of the TVPA’s protective goal by treating 
                                                          
 262. See 2011 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 69, at 25 (stating that the 
TVPA recognizes these subtle methods of psychological control forms of coercion). 
 263. See DOJ NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 236, at 32 (explaining that once a 
child becomes dependent, the pimp or trafficker may introduce the idea of 
prostitution as a way to help contribute to their “street family”); Amy Barasch & 
Barabara C. Kryszko, The Nexus Between Domestic Violence and Trafficking for Commercial 
Sexual Exploitation, in LAWYER’S MANUAL ON HUMAN TRAFFICKING, supra note 31, at 83, 
84–86 (comparing the control tactics of traffickers with the tactics of perpetrators of 
domestic violence); Sherman & Grace, supra note 25, at 339 (describing prostituted 
minors as experiencing a form of Stockholm Syndrome). 
 264. See In Our Own Backyard, supra note 1, at 45–46 (statement of Anita Alvarez, 
Cook County State’s Attorney) (stating that law enforcement faces a serious 
challenge in prosecuting trafficking of minors because victims’ vulnerabilities often 
lead them to view their pimp or trafficker as someone they rely on and love); DOJ 
NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 236, at 32 (noting that the difficulty of ending 
exploitation by traffickers is partly due to traffickers’ psychological hold on minors); 
Lauren Hersh, Sex Trafficking Investigations and Prosecutions, in LAWYER’S MANUAL ON 
HUMAN TRAFFICKING, supra note 31, at 256 (stating that victims’ complex 
relationships with their traffickers often render them too frightened and traumatized 
to participate in building a case against their traffickers). 
 265. See DOJ NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 236, at 139 (observing that victim-
assistance is part of DOJ’s strategy for maintaining progress in prosecuting trafficking 
cases). 
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prostituted minors as criminals, thereby re-traumatizing them, and by 
contributing to the misidentification of victims.  Criminalizing 
prostituted minors also frustrates the TVPA’s prosecutorial goal by 
encouraging misidentification of victims, thereby squandering 
opportunities to investigate and prosecute traffickers, and by 
discouraging victim witnesses from cooperating with law 
enforcement. 
Under the principles of implied conflict preemption, these 
conflicts indicate that states are prohibited from enforcing criminal 
prostitution laws against minors.  Indeed, the growing state-level 
embrace of Safe Harbor laws suggests that states may already be 
prepared to acknowledge that enforcing criminal prostitution laws 
against minors is untenable due not only to its conflict with federal 
law, but also due to what is now known about the reality of sex 
trafficking of minors. 
